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SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. A reﬁnement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisﬁes two assumptions is
shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense deﬁned by Kohlberg and Mertens. One
assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the
other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction is interpreted as the
requirement that each player’s strategy is sequentially rational and conditionally admissible
at every information set in an extensive-form game with perfect recall, implemented here
by requiring that the equilibrium is quasi-perfect. The strong version requires ‘truly’ quasi-
perfect in that each strategy perturbation reﬁnes the selection to a quasi-perfect equilibrium
in the set. An exact characterization of stable sets is provided for two-player games.
1. Introduction
This article studies reﬁnements of the equilibria of a non-cooperative game. As in other
contributions to this subject, the aim is to sharpen Nash’s [20, 21] original deﬁnition by
imposing additional decision-theoretic criteria. We adopt the standard axiom of invariance
to establish a connection between games in strategic (or ‘normal’) form and those in extensive
form (with perfect recall, which we assume throughout). Our contribution is to show that
a set selected by a reﬁnement satisfying a strong form of the backward-induction criterion
for an extensive-form game must be stable, as deﬁned by Kohlberg and Mertens [12] for the
strategic form of the game but without their insistence on a minimal stable subset.
Thus in x3 we deﬁne formally the two criteria called Invariance and Strong Backward
Induction, and then in x5 we prove:
Theorem. If a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria satisﬁes Invariance and Strong Backward
Induction then each selected subset is stable.
The main concepts in the theorem are deﬁned in x3. Brieﬂy:
Invariance. Invariance requires that a reﬁnement is immune to treating a mixed strategy
as an additional pure strategy. Its role is to exclude some kinds of presentation eﬀects.
Its chief implication is that a reﬁnement depends only on the reduced form of the game,
i.e. only on the strategically equivalent game obtained by deleting redundant strategies
from the strategic form.
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Backward Induction. For a game in extensive form, the criterion of backward induc-
tion or ‘sequential rationality’ is usually implemented by requiring that a selected subset
includes a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [13]). Here the criterion is strength-
ened by requiring conditional admissibility, i.e. by excluding a strategy that is weakly
dominated in the continuation from some information set. This is implemented by re-
quiring that the equilibrium is quasi-perfect (van Damme [6]).
1 Using quasi-perfection to
represent backward induction brings the advantage that the generally accepted axioms
of admissibility and conditional admissibility are included automatically.
Strong Backward Induction. Sequential equilibrium outcomes can be sustained by many
diﬀerent conditional probability systems (‘beliefs’ in [13]), and similarly, diﬀerent quasi-
perfect equilibria result from considering diﬀerent perturbations of players’ strategies.
Strong Backward Induction (SBI) requires that each perturbation of players’ strategies
reﬁnes the selection further by identifying a quasi-perfect equilibrium within the selected
subset.
Stability. A subset of the Nash equilibria is stable if each nearby game, obtained by
perturbing each player’s strategies by a ‘tremble,’ has a nearby equilibrium. This is the
concept of stability deﬁned by Kohlberg and Mertens [12] but without their insistence
on selecting a minimal stable subset.
SBI strengthens the criterion of ‘truly perfect’ (perfect with respect to all possible trem-
bles) that originally motivated Kohlberg and Mertens’ [12] deﬁnition of a stable set. In
eﬀect, SBI requires that a selected subset includes all the sequential equilibria in admissible
strategies sustained by beliefs generated by perturbations of the game. Invariance and SBI
together imply that a reﬁnement selects a subset that includes a sequential equilibrium for
every extensive form having the same reduced strategic form obtained by deleting redundant
strategies (x2.3 provides an explicit example). Due to Invariance, this implication is stronger
than the property of a proper equilibrium of a strategic form; viz., a proper equilibrium in-
duces a sequential equilibrium in each extensive form with the same (non-reduced) strategic
form. In general a stable subset might not contain a sequential equilibrium [12, example in
Figure 11], so the subclass of stable subsets allowed by the theorem represents a reﬁnement
of stability.
For readers who are not familiar with the early literature on reﬁnements from the 1970-
80s, x2 reviews informally the main antecedents of this article and presents some motivating
examples. For a survey and critical examination of equilibrium reﬁnements see Hillas and
1A quasi-perfect equilibrium diﬀers from a perfect equilibrium (Selten [23]) of the extensive form of a
game by excluding a player’s anticipation of his own trembles. We slightly modify van Damme’s deﬁnition
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Kohlberg [11]. After the formulation in x3, stability is characterized and the theorem is
proved in x4 for a game with two players, which is simpler than the general proof in x5.
Concluding remarks are in x6. Appendices provide direct proofs for two cases of special
interest.
2. Background and Motivation
The central concept in the study of non-cooperative games is the deﬁnition of equilibrium
proposed by Nash [20, 21]. Nash interprets a player’s strategy as a ‘mixed’ strategy, i.e. a
randomization over pure strategies, each of which is a complete plan specifying the action
to be taken in each contingency that might arise in the course of the game. Thus a game is
speciﬁed by the strategic form that assigns to the players their utility payoﬀs from each proﬁle
of their pure strategies, and by extension, expected payoﬀs to each proﬁle of their (mixed)
strategies. Nash’s deﬁnition of an equilibrium proﬁle of strategies requires that each player’s
strategy is an optimal reply to the other players’ strategies. Although Nash’s deﬁnition can
be applied to a game in the extensive form that describes explicitly the evolution of play, it
depends only on the strategic form derived from the extensive form.
Selten [22, 23] initiated two lines of research aimed at reﬁning Nash’s deﬁnition of equilib-
rium. The ﬁrst line invokes directly various decision-theoretic criteria that are stronger than
Nash invokes. For example, admissibility and invariance are relevant criteria for a game in
strategic form, and subgame perfection, sequential rationality (as in sequential equilibria),
and quasi-perfection are relevant for a game in extensive form. The second line pursues
a general method based on examining perturbations of the game. Its purpose is to obtain
reﬁnements that satisfy many decision-theoretic criteria simultaneously. For example, requir-
ing that an equilibrium is aﬀected slightly by perturbations excludes inadmissible equilibria,
i.e. that use weakly dominated pure strategies. These two lines have basically the same
goal although they use diﬀerent methods. That goal is to characterize equilibria that are
‘self-enforcing’ according to a higher standard than Nash’s deﬁnition requires. Perturbation
methods have been remarkably successful, but the technique is often complicated, and for
applications it often suﬃces to impose decision-theoretic criteria directly.
Both lines strengthen Nash’s deﬁnition so as to exclude equilibria that are considered
implausible. For example, in the context of the strategic form one wants to exclude an
equilibrium that uses a weakly dominated pure strategy, or that depends on the existence
of a pure strategy that is not an optimal reply at the equilibrium. In the context of the
extensive form, one wants to exclude an equilibrium that is ‘not credible’ because it relies














Figure 1. A game with an equilibrium that is not credible if C cannot commit
to her strategy a;d.
explicitly in the extensive form. For instance, consider the game in Figure 1 in which player R
(Row) chooses between T (top) and B (bottom) and then C (Col) responds. The equilibrium
(T;a;d) is considered not credible because it relies on C’s threat to respond to B with d,
whereas in the actual event C prefers c to d.
2.1. Reﬁnements Based on Speciﬁc Criteria. Selten [22] began the ﬁrst line of research.
He argued that extensive-form considerations enable a selection among the Nash equilibria.
He proposed selecting from among the equilibria one that induces an equilibrium in each
subgame of the extensive form, i.e. one that is subgame-perfect. Subgame-perfection requires
that each player’s strategy is consistent with the procedure of backward induction used in the
analysis of a decision tree with a single decision maker. Kreps and Wilson’s [13] deﬁnition
of sequential equilibrium extends this approach to games with imperfect information. They
require that the continuation from each contingency (a player’s information set) is optimal
with respect to a conditional probability system (for assessing the probabilities of prior
histories) that is consistent with the structure of the game and other players’ strategies. Van
Damme’s [6] deﬁnition of quasi-perfect equilibrium imposes further restrictions described in
x2.2.
The main deﬁciency of these reﬁnements is that they depend sensitively on which extensive
form is used, i.e. they are plagued with presentation eﬀects. For instance, in Figure 2 in the
top presentation there is one sequential equilibrium (r;r0;b) and others in which R chooses
`;`0. But in the bottom presentation subgame-perfection yields only the outcome (r;r0;b) in
the subgame in strategic form. Some additional criterion like Invariance is needed to ensure
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Figure 2. A game with multiple sequential equilibrium outcomes in the top
presentation, and only one in the bottom presentation (Hillas [10]).
then deﬁciencies remain; e.g., a sequential equilibrium can use an inadmissible strategy, as
in Figure 4 below.
Typical of other work in this vein is Cho and Kreps’ [5] Intuitive Criterion for selecting
among the sequential equilibria of signaling games. They require that there cannot be some
type of the sender that surely gains from deviating were the receiver to respond with a
strategy that is optimal based on a belief that assigns zero probability to those types of
the sender that cannot gain from the deviation. That is, an equilibrium fails the Intuitive
Criterion if the receiver’s belief fails to recognize that the sender’s deviation is a credible
signal about his type. For example, in Figure 3 the sequential equilibria with the outcome
(r;r0;b) are rejected because R would gain by choosing `0 in the bottom contingency if C
were to choose b0, which is optimal for C if she recognizes the deviation as a credible signal
that the bottom contingency has occurred—and indeed credibility is implied by the fact that
in the top contingency R cannot gain by deviating to `.
Stability essentially implies the Intuitive Criterion and its extensions by Banks and So-
bel [1]. In particular, Kohlberg and Mertens [12, Proposition 6] prove that a stable set S
contains a stable set of the game obtained by deleting strategies that are inferior responses




















Figure 3. A signaling game with two sequential equilibrium outcomes, one
of which is rejected by the Intuitive Criterion
2.2. Reﬁnements Based on Perturbations. Selten [23] also opened the second line of
research. He proposed selecting an equilibrium that is the limit of equilibria of perturbed
games. The advantage of this computational method is that it assures that various decision-
theoretic criteria are satisﬁed. Applied to the strategic form it assures admissibility, and
applied to (the agent strategic form of) the extensive form it yields a sequential equilibrium.
Selten deﬁnes a perfect equilibrium of the strategic form as the limit ¾ = lim"#0 ¾" of a
sequence of proﬁles of completely mixed strategies for which ¾"
n(s) 6 " if the pure strategy
s is in an inferior reply for player n against ¾". Myerson [19] deﬁnes a proper equilibrium
analogously except that if s is inferior to s0 then ¾"
n(s) 6 "¾"
n(s0). An advantage of a proper
equilibrium of the strategic form is that it induces a quasi-perfect and hence sequential
equilibrium in every extensive form with that strategic form [6, Theorem 1],[12, Proposition
0].
Selten shows that an equivalent deﬁnition of a perfect equilibrium is that each player’s
strategy is an optimal reply to each proﬁle of completely mixed strategies of other players
in a sequence converging to their equilibrium proﬁle. For a game in extensive form, van
Damme’s [6] deﬁnition of a quasi-perfect equilibrium is similar: each player uses only actions
at an information set that are part of an optimal continuation in reply to perturbations of
other players’ strategies converging to their equilibrium strategies. This ensures admissibility
of continuation strategies in each contingency, but importantly, while taking account of small
trembles by other players, the player ignores his own trembles both currently and also later
in the game. Figure 4 shows van Damme’s example in which both (T;a;c) and (B;a;c) are
sequential equilibria,2 but the second is not quasi-perfect—as is evident from the fact that R’s














Figure 4. A game with multiple sequential equilibria but only (T;a;c) is
quasi-perfect.
strategy (T;a) weakly dominates (B;a), which is therefore inadmissible in the strategic form.
Van Damme [6] shows that a proper equilibrium induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium, and
hence a sequential equilibrium, in every extensive form with that strategic form. A partial
converse is that a quasi-perfect equilibrium induces a perfect equilibrium of the strategic
form.
Subsequent development of reﬁnements based on perturbations was inﬂuenced greatly by
the work of Kohlberg and Mertens [12] (KM hereafter). They envisioned characterizing an
ideal reﬁnement by decision-theoretic criteria adopted as axioms. To identify what the ideal
reﬁnement would be, they examined several that satisfy most of the criteria they considered.
KM’s analysis relies on a fundamental mathematical fact that we explain below using
Figure 5. KM show that the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to
the (one point compactiﬁcation of the) space of games obtained by varying players’ payoﬀs,
i.e. the graph is a deformed copy of the space of games. This ‘structure theorem’ is much
more speciﬁc than the usual weak characterization of the equilibrium correspondence as
upper-semi-continuous. The structure theorem is illustrated schematically in the ﬁgure as
though the spaces of games and strategy proﬁles are each one-dimensional. Equilibrium
components of game G, shown as vertical segments of the graph, are intrinsic to the study of
reﬁnements because (a) games in extensive form are nongeneric in the space of games, and
(b) for an extensive-form game whose payoﬀs are generic in the subspace of games with the
same game tree, the outcome of a sequential equilibrium is obtained by all equilibria in the
same component (Kreps and Wilson [13], Govindan and Wilson [8]), i.e. they agree along
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Figure 5. Schematic diagram of the graph of equilibria over the space of
games obtained by varying payoﬀs.
KM’s basic conclusion is that a reﬁnement should select a subset of equilibria that is
‘stable’ against all perturbations of the strategic form of the game in a suﬃciently rich class.
To avoid confusions of terminology, below we use ‘robust’ rather than ‘stable,’ or say that
the subset ‘survives perturbations’ in the sense that every perturbed game nearby has an
equilibrium nearby. Their conclusion depends on several preliminary considerations.
(1) A robust subset exists. The homeomorphism implies that every game has a compo-
nent of its equilibria that survives all payoﬀ perturbations in the sense that every
nearby game has a nearby equilibrium. In the ﬁgure, the isolated equilibria #1 and
#2 and the component #4 are robust in this sense. Not shown is the further impor-
tant property that some robust subset satisﬁes Invariance, i.e. if game G is enlarged
by treating some mixed strategy as a pure strategy then the strategically equivalent
subset in the enlarged game is also robust.3
(2) A reﬁnement should consider a suﬃciently rich class of perturbations. In the ﬁgure
the component #3 of equilibria of game G has two endpoints that are each ‘perfect’
in the sense that nearby games to the right of G have nearby equilibria, but games
to the left of G have no equilibria near this component.
3In [9] we show that a component is essential (has nonzero index) if and only if it satisﬁes a slightly
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(3) A reﬁnement should select a subset rather than a single equilibrium. In the ﬁgure the
component #4 is robust as a set, but no single point is robust—games to the right
of G have equilibria only near the top endpoint and games to the left have equilibria
only near near the bottom endpoint.
(4) A reﬁnement can consider all perturbations in any suﬃciently rich class of perturba-
tions. The preceding three considerations remain true for various classes of pertur-
bations that are smaller than the class of all payoﬀ perturbations. For example, the
eﬀect of perturbations of players’ strategies by trembles (as in Selten’s formulation)
induces a (lower dimensional) subclass of payoﬀ perturbations.
Based on these considerations, KM deﬁne three reﬁnements based on successively smaller
subclasses of perturbations of the strategic form of the game. In each case they include
the auxiliary requirements that a selected subset is closed and minimal among those with
the speciﬁed property. Further, Invariance is always assumed, so the property must persist
for every enlargement of the game obtained by treating any ﬁnite set of mixed strategies
as additional pure strategies—or equivalently, the reﬁnement depends only on the reduced
strategic form of the game.
² A hyperstable subset of the equilibria survives all payoﬀ perturbations.
² A fully-stable subset survives all polyhedral perturbations of players’ strategies. That
is, each neighborhood of the subset contains an equilibrium of the perturbed game
obtained by restricting each player to a closed convex polyhedron of completely mixed
strategies, provided each of these polyhedra is suﬃciently close (in Hausdorﬀ distance)
to the simplex of that player’s mixed strategies.
² A stable subset survives all trembles of players’ strategies. Speciﬁcally, for every
" > 0 there exists ¯ ± > 0 such that for each ± 2 (0; ¯ ±)N and completely mixed proﬁle
´ the perturbed game obtained by replacing each pure strategy sn of each player n
by the mixture [1 ¡ ±n]sn + ±n´n has an equilibrium within " of the subset.
From (1) above, some component contains a hyperstable subset, and within that there
is a fully stable subset, which in turn contains a stable subset, since smaller subsets can
survive smaller classes of perturbations. A fully-stable subset is useful because it necessarily
contains a proper equilibrium of the strategic form that induces a sequential equilibrium
in every extensive form with that strategic form. But a hyperstable or fully-stable subset
can include equilibria that use inadmissible strategies, which is why KM focus on stable
subsets. However, for an extensive-form game, a stable subset need not contain a sequential
equilibrium.10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
R C: D d a
D 1,0 1,0 1,0
d 0,2 3,0 3,0
a 0,2 0,4 0,0
Table 1. Strategic form G of the game Γ in Figure 6
KM’s article ended perplexed that no one of their three reﬁnements ensures both admissi-
bility and backward induction. This conundrum was resolved later by Mertens [16, 17] who
deﬁned a stronger reﬁnement (called here Mertens-stability) that satisﬁes all the criteria
examined by KM, and more besides. Because Mertens-stability is couched in the apparatus
of the theory of homology developed in algebraic topology, it is not widely accessible to
non-specialists and we do not set forth its deﬁnition here.
Our purpose in this article is to show that KM’s stability can be reﬁned to select stable
subsets that do indeed satisfy admissibility and backward induction. As described in the
opening paragraphs of x1, we prove that a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance and Strong
Backward Induction (SBI), deﬁned formally in x3, contains a stable subset. Existence of
stable subsets with these properties is assured because they are implied by Mertens-stability.
2.3. A Simple Example. In this subsection an example illustrates the interaction between
Invariance and SBI. The example is suﬃciently simple that it suﬃces to ignore admissibility
and to represent backward induction by sequential equilibrium.
Figure 6 shows at the top an extensive-form game Γ in which players R and C alternate
moves. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium each player chooses down at his ﬁrst opportunity,
which we represent by the pure strategy D, ignoring his subsequent choice were the player
to err. With this convention the strategic form G of this game is shown in Table 1.
There is a single component of the Nash equilibria of G, in which R uses D and C uses any
mixed strategy for which the probability of D is > 2=3. The component of perfect equilibria
requires further that C’s probability of a is zero. The minimal stable subset consists of the
two endpoints of the perfect-equilibrium component; viz., the subgame-perfect equilibrium
(D;D), and (D;y±) where y± = (2=3;1=3;0) is the mixed strategy with probabilities 2/3 and
1/3 for D and d.
Figure 6 shows at the bottom the expansion Γ(±) of the extensive form in which player R
can reject D and then choose either the mixed strategy x(±) = (1¡±;±=4;3±=4) or continue by
choosing A and then later d or a if C chooses A. The two information sets of C indicate that
C cannot know whether R chose x(±). Thus, the expanded game has imperfect information
in the sense of imperfect observability of R’s choice. Even so, the reduced strategic form ofSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 11
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Figure 6. Top: A game Γ between players R and C. Bottom: The game
modiﬁed so that player R can commit to the mixed strategy x(±) after rejecting
D.
the expanded game is the same as the original strategic form G in Table 1, since x(±) is a
redundant strategy.
Assume that 0 < ± < 1. One can easily verify that there is a unique sequential equilibrium
in the expanded extensive form Γ(±). In the strategic form this is the equilibrium in which
R chooses D and C randomizes between D and d with probabilities ®(±) and 1¡®(±), where
®(±) = [8 + ±]=[12 ¡ 3±]. In the extensive form this is sustained by C’s belief at her ﬁrst
information set that the conditional probability that R chose x(±) given that he rejected D
is ¯(±) = 2=[2+±]. By Bayes’ Rule, the conditional probability that R chose x(±) given that
A occurred is p = 2=3.
A reﬁnement that includes the sequential equilibrium of each expanded extensive form Γ(±)
must therefore include every proﬁle (D;®(±);1 ¡ ®(±);0) as ± varies between zero and one.
Since ®(0) = 2=3 and ®(1) = 1 this requires the reﬁnement to select the entire component of12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
perfect equilibria. In fact, this is precisely the Mertens-stable subset. Appendix A extends
the analysis of this example to general two-player games with perfect information.
As described in x2.1, reﬁnements like subgame-perfection and sequential equilibrium that
focus on the extensive form aim to exclude equilibria that are not credible because they rely
on an ability to commit to a strategy that is not modelled explicitly. In contrast, the strategic
form seems to assume commitment. And seemingly worse, the above example illustrates
that a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance allows a player to commit to a redundant strategy
midway in the extensive form. The resolution of this conundrum lies in the additional
assumption of backward induction. Together, Invariance and backward induction imply that
a selected subset must include a sequential equilibrium of each expanded extensive form with
the same reduced strategic form. In x4 and x5 we prove in general that the conjunction of
Invariance and Strong Backward Induction implies that a selected subset must contain a
stable subset of the reduced strategic form.
3. Formulation
We consider games with ﬁnite sets of players and pure strategies. The strategic form of a
game is speciﬁed by a payoﬀ function G :
Q
n2N Sn ! RN where N is the set of players and
Sn is player n’s set of pure strategies. Interpret a pure strategy sn as a vertex of player n’s
simplex Σn = ∆(Sn) of mixed strategies. The sets of proﬁles of pure and mixed strategies
are S =
Q
n Sn and Σ =
Q
n Σn.
In a game G a pure strategy sn of player n is redundant if n has in G a mixed strategy
¾n 6= sn that for every proﬁle of mixed strategies of the other players yields for every player
the same expected payoﬀ as sn yields. The strategic form is reduced if no pure strategy is
redundant. Say that two games are equivalent if their reduced strategic forms are the same
(except for labelling of pure strategies). We use the reduced strategic form of a game as the
representative of its equivalence class. Each game in an equivalence class is an expansion of
its reduced strategic form obtained by adjoining redundant pure strategies.
Say that two mixed strategies of a player in two equivalent games are equivalent if they
induce the same probability distribution (called their reduced version) on his pure strategies
in the reduced strategic form. Similarly, two proﬁles are equivalent if the players’ strategies
are equivalent, and two sets of proﬁles are equivalent if they induce the same sets of proﬁles
in the reduced strategic form.
In general, a reﬁnement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a collection of closed,
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induces a family of equivalent equilibria for each expansion of the game obtained by adding
redundant strategies. Therefore, we assume:4
Assumption 3.1. Invariance. Each selected subset is equivalent to a subset selected for
an equivalent game. Speciﬁcally, if G and ˜ G are equivalent games then a subset Σ± selected
for G is equivalent to some subset ˜ Σ± selected for ˜ G.
In particular, every equivalent game has a selected subset whose reduced version is a selected
subset of the reduced strategic form. This is slightly weaker than requiring that a reﬁnement
depends only on the equivalence classes of games and strategies; cf. Mertens[18] for a detailed
discussion of invariance, and more generally the concept of ordinality for games.
To each game in strategic form we associate those games in extensive form with perfect
recall that have that strategic form. Each extensive form speciﬁes a disjoint collection
H = fHn j n 2 Ng of the players’ information sets, and for each information set h 2 Hn
it speciﬁes a set An(h) of possible actions by n at h. In its strategic form the set of pure
strategies of player n is Sn = fsn : Hn ! [h2HnAn(h) j sn(h) 2 An(h)g. The projection of
Sn onto h and n’s information sets that follow h is denoted Snjh; that is, Snjh is the set of
n’s continuation strategies from h. Let Sn(h) be the set of n’s pure strategies that choose
all of n’s actions necessary to reach h 2 Hn, and let Sn(ajh) be the subset of strategies
in Sn(h) that choose a 2 An(h). Then a completely mixed strategy ¾n À 0 induces the




sn2Sn(h) ¾n(sn) of choosing a at h.
More generally, a behavior strategy ¯n 2
Q
h2Hn ∆(An(h)) assigns to each information set h
a probability ¯n(ajh) of action a 2 An(h) if h is reached. Kuhn [14] shows that mixed and
behavior strategies are payoﬀ-equivalent in extensive-form games with perfect recall.
Given a game in extensive form, an action perturbation " : H ! (0;1)2 assigns to each
information set a pair ("(h); ¯ "(h)) of small positive numbers, where 0 < "(h) 6 ¯ "(h). Use
f"g to denote a sequence of action perturbations that converges to 0.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Quasi-Perfect.5 A sequence f¾"g of proﬁles is f"g-quasi-perfect if for each
a 2 An;h 2 Hn;n 2 N and each action perturbation ":
(1) ¾"
n(ajh) > "(h), and
4The proof of the main theorem uses only a slightly weaker version: a selected subset is equivalent to a
superset of one selected for an expanded game obtained by adding redundant strategies.
5This deﬁnition diﬀers from van Damme [6] in that the upper bound ¯ "(¢) of the error probability can diﬀer
across information sets. However, it is easily shown that the set of quasi-perfect equilibria as deﬁned by van
Damme is the set of all proﬁles of behavioral strategies equivalent to limits of sequences of f"g-quasi-perfect
equilibria as deﬁned here in terms of mixed strategies. van Damme does not impose an explicit lower bound
but because the strategies are completely mixed there is an implicit lower bound that shrinks to zero as
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(2) ¾"
n(ajh) > ¯ "(h) only if a is an optimal action at h in reply to ¾"; that is, only if
sn(h) = a for some continuation strategy sn 2 argmaxs2Snjh E[Gn j h;s;¾"
¡n].
Suppose that ¾n(¢jh) = lim"#0 ¾"
n(¢jh). Then this deﬁnition says that player n’s continua-
tion strategy at h assigns a positive conditional probability ¾n(ajh) > 0 to action a only if a is
chosen by a continuation strategy that is an optimal reply to suﬃciently small perturbations
(¾"
n0)n06=n of other players’ strategies. Thus when solving his dynamic programming problem,
player n takes account of vanishingly small trembles by other players but ignores his own
trembles later in the game. In particular, this enforces admissibility of continuation strategies
conditional on having reached h. Van Damme [6] shows that the pair (¹;¯) = lim"#0(¹";¯")
of belief and behavior proﬁles is a sequential equilibrium, where ¾" induces at h 2 Hn the
conditional probability ¹"
n(tjh) of node t 2 h and the behavior ¯"
n(ajh) = ¾"
n(ajh) is player
n’s conditional probability of choosing a at h.
Our second assumption requires that each sequence of action perturbations induces a
further selection among the proﬁles in a selected set.
Assumption 3.3. Strong Backward Induction. For a game in extensive form with
perfect recall for which a reﬁnement selects a subset Σ± of equilibria, for each sequence
f"g of action perturbations there exists a proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ± that is the limit of a convergent
subsequence f¾"g of f"g-quasi-perfect proﬁles.
This assumption could as well be called ‘truly’ or Strong Quasi-Perfection. As the proofs in
Sections 3 and 4 show, Theorem 1 remains true if Assumption 3.3 is weakened by requiring
action perturbations to satisfy the additional restriction that "(h) = ¯ "(h) for all h. The
reason we do not do so is conceptual. The lower bound "(¢) reﬂects the requirement that
every action of a player is chosen with positive probability, while ¯ "(¢) provides the upper
bound on the “error probability” of suboptimal actions at an information set.
We conclude this section by deﬁning stability. In general, a closed subset of the equilibria
of a game in strategic form is deemed stable if, for any neighborhood of the set, every
game obtained from a suﬃciently small perturbation of payoﬀs has an equilibrium in the
neighborhood. However, to ensure admissibility, KM focus on sets that are stable only
against those payoﬀ perturbations induced by strategy perturbations.
For 0 6 ± 6 1, let P± = f(¸n¿n)n2N j (8 n) 0 6 ¸n 6 ±;¿n 2 Σng and let @P± be the
topological boundary of P±. For each ´ 2 P1, and n 2 N, let ´n =
P
s2Sn ´n(s). Given any
´ 2 P1, a perturbed game G(´) is obtained by replacing each pure strategy sn of player n
with ´n + (1 ¡ ´n)sn. Thus G(´) is the perturbed game in which the strategy sets of the
players are restricted so that the probability that n plays a strategy s 2 Sn must be at leastSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 15
´n;s. For a vector (¸;¿) 2 [0;1]N £ Σ, we sometimes write G(¸;¿) to denote the perturbed
game G((¸n¿n)n2N).
Deﬁnition 3.4. Stability. A closed set Σ± of equilibria of the game G is stable if for each
² > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that for each ´ 2 P±n@P± the perturbed game G(´) has an
equilibrium within ² of Σ±.
To avoid the trivially stable set of all equilibria, KM focus on minimal stable sets:
Deﬁnition 3.5. KM-Stability. A set of equilibria of the game G is KM-stable if it is a
minimal stable set.
4. Two-Player Games
This section provides a direct proof of the main theorem for the special case of two players.
It is simpler than the proof of the general case in x5 because two-player games have a linear
structure. This structure enables a generalization—statement (3) in the following Theorem—
of the characterization of stability obtained by Cho and Kreps [5] and Banks and Sobel [1]
for the special case of sender-receiver signaling games in extensive form with generic payoﬀs.
Theorem 4.1 (Characterization of Stability). Let G be a 2-player game, and let Σ± be a
closed subset of equilibria of G. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) Σ± is a stable set of the game G.
(2) For each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists sequence ¾k in Σ converging to a point in Σ± and a
corresponding sequence ¸k in (0;1) converging to 0, such that ¾k is an equilibrium
of G(¸k¿) for all k.
(3) For each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists ¾± 2 Σ±, a proﬁle ˜ ¾ 2 Σ, and 0 < ¸ 6 1 such that,
for each player n, ¸¾±
n(s) + [1 ¡ ¸]˜ ¾n(s) is an optimal reply against both ¾± and the
proﬁle ¾¤ = ¸¿ + [1 ¡ ¸]˜ ¾.
Proof. We prove ﬁrst that statement 1 implies statement 2. Suppose Σ± is a stable set. Fix
¿ 2 Σn@Σ. Then for each positive integer k one can choose ¸k 2 (0;1=k) and an equilibrium
¾k of G(¸k¿) whose distance from Σ± is less than 1=k. Let ¾± be the limit of a convergent
subsequence of ¾k. Then ¾± 2 Σ±, which completes the proof.
Next we prove that statement 2 implies statement 3. Fix ¿ 2 Σn@Σ. Statement 2 assures
us that there exists a sequence ¸k in (0;1) converging to zero and a sequence ¾k of equilibria
of G(¸k¿) converging to an equilibrium ¾± in Σ±. By passing to a subsequence if necessary,
we can assume that the set of optimal replies in G to ¾k is the same for all k. Deﬁne ¾¤ and
¸ to be the ﬁrst elements of the sequences of ¾k and ¸k. And let ˜ ¾ = [¾¤¡¸¿]=(1¡¸). Then,16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
¾¤ = (1¡¸)˜ ¾+¸¿. Because ¾¤ is an equilibrium of G(¸¿), ˜ ¾ is an optimal reply to ¾¤. The
best replies being constant along the sequence of ¾k, ˜ ¾ is a best reply all along the sequence
of ¾k and hence to the limit, ¾±. Because the sequence of ¾k are equilibria of perturbed
games converging to it, ¾± is optimal against ¾k for large k and is therefore optimal against
the entire sequence ¾k (in particular against ¾¤ and the limit ¾0 itself). Thus, ˜ ¾ and ¾±
satisfy the optimality condition of statement 3.
Lastly we prove that statement 3 implies statement 1 by showing that Σ± satisﬁes the
property in Deﬁnition 3.4 of a stable set. Fix an ²-neighborhood of Σ±. Take a suﬃciently
ﬁne simplicial subdivision of Σ such that: (i) the union U of the simplices of this complex
that intersect Σ± is contained in its ²-neighborhood; and (ii) the best-reply correspondence
is constant over the interior of each simplex. Because G is a two-player game, this simplicial
subdivision can be done such that each simplex is actually a convex polytope. Observe that
U is itself a closed neighborhood of Σ±. Let Q be the set of all pairs (´;¾) 2 P1£U such that
¾ is an equilibrium of G(´); and let Q0 be the set of (0;¾) 2 Q, namely, the set of equilibria
of the game G that are contained in U. By property (ii) of the triangulation and because
the simplices are convex polytopes, Q and Q0 are ﬁnite unions of polytopes. Triangulate Q
such that Q0 is a subcomplex, and take a barycentric subdivision so that Q0 becomes a full
subcomplex. Because Q is a union of polytopes, both the triangulation and the projection
map p : Q ! P1 can be made piecewise-linear. Let X be the union of simplices of Q that
intersect Q0. Because Q0 is a full subcomplex the intersection of each simplex of Q with Q0
is a face of the simplex. Let X0 = X \ Q0 and let X1 be the union of simplices of X that
do not intersect Q0. Given x 2 X, there exists a unique simplex K of X that contains x in
its interior. Let K0 be the face of K that is in X0, and let K1 be the face of K spanned
by the vertices of K that do not belong to K0. K1 is then contained in X1. Therefore, x is
expressible as a convex combination [1 ¡ ®]x0 + ®x1, where xi 2 Ki for i = 0;1; moreover,
this combination is unique if x 62 X0 [ X1. Finally, p(x) = [1 ¡ ®]p(x0) + ®p(x1) = ®p(x1)
because the projection map p is piecewise aﬃne.
Choose ±¤ > 0 such that for each (´;¾) 2 X1, maxn ´n > ±¤. Such a choice is possible
because X1 is a compact subset of Q that is disjoint from Q0. Fix now ±1;±2 < ±¤ and
¿ 2 Σ. The proof is complete if we show that the game G(±1¿1;±2¿2) has an equilibrium
in U. By statement 3, there exists ¾± 2 Σ±, ˜ ¾ 2 Σ and 0 < ¹ 6 1 such that ¾(°) =
((1 ¡ °±n)¾±
n + °±n((1 ¡ ¹)˜ ¾n + ¹¿n))n=1;2 is an equilibrium of G(°¹(±1¿1;±2¿2)) for all 0 6
° 6 1. Because ¾(0) = ¾± 2 Σ±, we can choose ° suﬃciently small that the point x =
(°¹(±1¿1;±2¿2);¾(°)) belongs to Xn(X0 [ X1); hence there exists a unique ® 2 (0;1) and
xi 2 Xi for i = 0;1 such that x is an ®-combination of x0 and x1. As remarked before,SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 17
p(x) = ®p(x1). Therefore, there exists ¾ 2 Σ such that x1 = (°¤¹(±1¿1;±2¿2);¾), where
°¤ = °=®. Because points in X1 project to P1nP±¤, °¤¹±n > ±¤ for some n; that is, °¤¹ > 1
since ±n < ±¤ for each n by assumption. Therefore, the point [1 ¡ 1=°¤¹]x0 + [1=°¤¹]x1
corresponds to an equilibrium of the game G(±1¿1;±2¿2) that lies in U. This proves statement
1. ¤
The characterization in statement 3 of Theorem 4.1 can be stated equivalently in terms
of a lexicographic probability system (LPS) as in Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2]. As
a matter of terminology, given an LPS (¾0
m;:::;¾k
m) for player m, we say that for player
n 6= m, a strategy ¾n is a better reply against the LPS than another strategy ¾0
n if it is a
lexicographic better reply. (Here, and throughout the paper, by a better reply we mean a
strictly better reply as opposed to a weakly better reply.) And ¾n is a best reply against the
LPS if there is no better reply.
Corollary 4.2 (Lexicographic Characterization). A closed set Σ± of equilibria of G is a
stable set if and only if for each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists ¾0 2 Σ±, a proﬁle ˜ ¾ 2 Σ, and for
each player n, an LPS Ln = (¾0
n;:::;¾Kn
n ) where Kn > 0 and ¾Kn
n = [1 ¡ ¸n]˜ ¾n + ¸n¿n for
some ¸n 2 (0;1], such that for each player n every strategy that is either: (i) in the support
of ¾k with k < Kn or (ii) in the support of ˜ ¾n if ¸n < 1, is a best reply to the LPS of the
other player.
Proof. The necessity of the condition follows from statement 3. As for suﬃciency, we show
that the condition of the Corollary implies statement 2. Fix ¿ 2 Σn@Σ and let (L1;L2)
be as in the Corollary. Choose an integer K that is greater than Kn for each n. For
each n, deﬁne a new LPS L0
n = (ˆ ¾0
n;:::; ˆ ¾K
n ) as follows: for 0 6 k 6 K ¡ Kn, ˆ ¾k
n = ¾±
n; for
K¡Kn+1 6 k < K, ˆ ¾k
n = ¾k¡K+Kn
n ; ˆ ¾K
n = [¹=¸n]¾Kn
n +[1¡¹=¸n]¾±
n, where ¹ = min(¸1;¸2).
Observe that for each n,
ˆ ¾
K
n = ¹¿n + [(¹(1 ¡ ¸n)˜ ¾n + (¸n ¡ ¹)¾
0]=¸n:
Therefore, the LPS proﬁle (L0
1;L0
2) satisﬁes the condition of the Corollary as well. For ® > 0,







n). For all small ®, we now have that ¾(®) is





¾(®) converges to ¾0 as ® goes to zero, the condition of the Corollary implies statement 2
of the Theorem. ¤
We show in Appendix A that for generic two-person extensive form games, the require-
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mentioned before, (a version of) the characterization of stability in statement 3 of Theo-
rem 4.1 is obtained by Cho and Kreps [5] and Banks and Sobel [1] for the special case of
sender-receiver signaling games in extensive form with generic payoﬀs—games like the one
in Figure 3. In Appendix C we show directly that if a component of the equilibria violates
this condition then a single redundant strategy can be adjoined to obtain an equivalent game
that has no proper equilibrium yielding the same outcome.
We conclude this section by proving the main theorem for two-player games.6
Proposition 4.3 (Suﬃciency of the Assumptions). If a reﬁnement satisﬁes Invariance and
Strong Backward Induction then for any two-player game a selected subset is a stable set of
the equilibria of its strategic form.
Proof. Let G be the strategic form of a 2-player game. Suppose that Σ± ½ Σ is a set selected
by a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance and Strong Backward Induction. Let ¿ = (¿1;¿2) be
any proﬁle in the interior of Σ. We show that Σ± satisﬁes the condition of Corollary 4.2 for ¿.
Construct as follows the extensive-form game Γ with perfect recall that has a strategic form
that is an expansion of G. In Γ each player n ﬁrst chooses whether or not to use the mixed
strategy ¿n, and if not, then which pure strategy in Sn to use. Denote the two information
sets at which n makes these choices by h0
n and h00
n. At neither of these does n have any
information about the other player’s analogous choices. In Γ the set of pure strategies for
player n is S¤
n = f¿ng[Sn (after identifying all strategies where n chooses to play ¿n at his ﬁrst
information set h0
n) and the corresponding simplex of mixed strategies is Σ¤
n. For each ± > 0
in a sequence converging to zero, let f"g be a sequence of action perturbations that require
the minimum probability of each action at h0
n to be "(h0
n) = ±, and the maximum probability
of suboptimal actions at h00
n to be ¯ "(h00
n) = ±2. By Invariance, the reﬁnement selects a set
˜ Σ± for Γ that is a subset of those strategies equivalent to ones in Σ±. By Strong Backward
Induction there exists a subsequence f˜ ¾"g of f"g-quasi-perfect proﬁles converging to some
point ˜ ¾0 2 ˜ Σ±. If necessary by passing to a subsequence, by Blume, Brandenberger, and








k=0 supp ˜ ¾k
n = S¤
n; and (ii) for each 0 6 k < Kn a sequence of
positive numbers ¸k
n(") converging to zero such that each ˜ ¾"
n in the sequence is expressible









6An anonymous referee has shown in his or her report that for 2-player games, in the deﬁnition of Strong
Backward Induction, quasi-perfection in the extensive form can be replaced by perfection in the strategic
form (we do not reproduce the referee’s proof here). This reﬂects indirectly the fact that for 2-player games
the sets of strategic-form perfect and admissible equilibria coincide.SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 19
k¤
n be the smallest k for which ˜ ¾k
n assigns positive probability to the “pure” strategy ¿n of
the expanded game.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose sn 2 Sn is not a best reply to the LPS of the other player. Then
sn 2 Sn is assigned zero probability by ˜ ¾k
n for k 6 k¤
n, and k¤
n > 0.
Proof of Lemma. Since sn is not a best reply to the LPS of the other player, suﬃciently




n) = ± and ˜ ¾"
n(snjh00
n) 6 ¯ "(h00






n(sn) = 0 for all k 6 k¤
n, which proves the ﬁrst statement of the lemma. As for
the second statement, observe that the pure strategy ¿n is not a best reply to the LPS of
the other player, since ¿n, viewed as a mixed strategy in Σn, has full support. Therefore, far
along the sequence, ¿n is not a best reply to ˜ ¾"
n. Quasi-perfection now requires that ¿n is
assigned the minimum probability ± by the sequence and hence its probability in the limit
˜ ¾0
n of the sequence ˜ ¾"
n is zero, which means that k¤
n > 0. ¤





n ) for the game
G by letting ¾k
n be the mixed strategy in Σn that is equivalent to ˜ ¾k
n. Because ˜ ¾0 2 ˜ Σ0, ¾0




the deﬁnition of k¤
n, ¸n > 0. If ¸n 6= 1, let ¾0
n be the mixed strategy in Σn that is given by the
conditional distribution over Sn induced by ˜ ¾
k¤
n
n , that is, the probability of a pure strategy
s 2 Sn under ¾0




n (s); if ¸n = 1, let ¾0
n be an arbitrary strategy in Σn. By the




n. For each n, deﬁne an LPS L0
n as follows: if k¤
n > 0,
then L0
n = Ln; otherwise, L0
n = (¾0
n;¾0
n). We now show that the LPS proﬁle (L0
1;L0
2) satisﬁes
the conditions of Corollary 4.2 for ¿. Each LPS L0
n has at least two levels, where the last
level is ¸n¿n + (1 ¡ ¸n)¾0
n, ¸n > 0. We now show that the optimality property in Corollary
4.2 holds for each player n. If k¤
n = 0 then by the previous Lemma every strategy of player
n is optimal. On the other hand, if k¤
n > 0 (and thus L0
n = Ln) then the ﬁrst result of the
previous Lemma and the following two observations imply the optimality property. (1) By
the deﬁnition of k¤
n and Ln, for each k < k¤
n the probability of each s 2 Sn is the same under
¾k
n and ˜ ¾k
n; (2) if ¸n 6= 1 then every strategy in the support of ¾0




Thus we have shown that Σ± is a stable set. ¤
5. N-Player Games
This section provides the proof of the main theorem for the general case with N players.7
7The proof suggests how to use the method in Govindan and Klumpp [7] to extend to N-player games
the characterization of stable sets for two-player games in Theorem 4.1, but we do not include it here.20 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
We begin with some deﬁnitions. For a real-valued analytic function (or more generally
a power series) f(t) =
P1
i=0 aiti in a single variable t, the order of f, denoted o(f), is the
smallest integer i such that ai 6= 0. The order of the zero function is +1. We say that a
power series f is positive if ao(f) > 0; thus if f is an analytic function then f is positive if
and only if f(t) is positive for all suﬃciently small t > 0. Suppose f and g are two power
series. We say that f > g if f ¡ g is positive. We have the following relations for orders of
power series. o(fg) = o(f) + o(g); and o(f + g) > min(o(f);o(g)), with equality if f and g
are both nonnegative (or nonpositive). Suppose f and g are real-valued analytic functions
deﬁned on (¡¯ t;¯ t) where t > 0 and g 6= 0. If o(f) > o(g) then there exists an analytic
function h : (¡¯ t;¯ t) ! R such that for each t 6= 0, h(t) = f(t)=g(t), i.e. dividing f by g yields
an analytic function.
By a slight abuse of terminology, we call a function F : [0;¯ t] ! X, where X is a subset of
a Euclidean space RL, analytic if there exists an analytic function F 0 : (¡±;±) ! RL, ± > ¯ t,
such that F 0 agrees with F on [0;¯ t]. For an analytic function F : [0;¯ t] ! Rk, the order o(F)
of F is mini o(Fi). If ¾ : [0;¯ t] ! Σ is an analytic function then for each pure strategy sn of
player n his payoﬀ Gn(¾¡n(t);sn) in the game G is an analytic function as well, since payoﬀ
functions are multilinear in mixed strategies. We say that sn is a best reply of order k for
player n against an analytic function ¾(t) if for all s0
n 2 Sn, Gn(¾¡n(t);sn) ¡ Gn(¾¡n(t);s0
n)
is either nonnegative or has order at least k + 1; also, sn is a best reply to ¾ if it is a best
reply of order 1.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose ¾;¿ : [0;¯ t] ! Σ are two analytic functions such that o(¾ ¡¿) > k. If
sn is not a best reply of order k against ¾ then it is not a best reply of order k against ¿.
Proof of Lemma. Let s0
n be a pure strategy such that Gn(¾¡n(t);sn) ¡ Gn(¾¡n(t);s0
n) is
negative and has order, say, ` 6 k. Let ¿0 = ¿ ¡ ¾. We can then write
Gn(¿¡n(t);sn) ¡ G(¿¡n(t);s
0






















The ﬁrst term on the right in the above expression is negative and has order ` by assumption.
Therefore, to prove the result it is enough to show that the order of the double summation
is at least k + 1: it then follows that the whole expression is negative and has order `. To
prove this last statement, using the above property of the order of sums of power series, it
is suﬃcient to show that each of the summands in the second term has order at least k+1.
Consider now a summand for a ﬁxed s¡n and N0 $ Nnfng. If both sn and s0
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payoﬀ against s¡n then the order of this term is 1. Otherwise, using the property of the









where the inequality follows from the following two facts: (i) the order of each ¾n0;sn0 is at
least zero; and (ii) there exists at least one n00 = 2 (N0 [fng) and for any such n00 the order of
¿0
n00;sn00 is greater than k by assumption. ¤
We use the following version of a result of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2, Proposition
2].
Lemma 5.2. If the map ¿n : [0;¯ t] ! Σn is analytic then there exists 0 < t¤ 6 ¯ t such that




n, where K 6 jSnj, each ¿k
n is in Σn, and each map
fk
n : [0;t¤] ! R+ is analytic.
Proof of Lemma. There is nothing to prove if ¿n is a constant map. Therefore, assume that
it is not. Let ¿0
n = ¿n(0) and let S0
n be the support of ¿0




n;s. Remark that if for some t, ¿n(t) 6= ¿0
n, then f0
n(t) < 1; indeed, if
f0
n(t) > 1 then for each pure strategy s (even if it is not in S0
n) ¿n;s(t) > ¿0
n;s and therefore
¿n(t) = ¿0
n. Since ¿n(t) is analytic, there now exist 0 < t0 6 ¯ t and s0 2 S0
n such that for
all t 6 t0, f0
n(t) = ¿n;s0(t)=¿n;s0, i.e. f0
n is analytic on [0;t0]. Moreover, since ¿n(t) is not a
constant function and since ¿n;s0(0) > 0, t0 can be chosen such that for all 0 < t 6 t0: (i)
¿n(t) 6= ¿0
n; and (ii) ¿n;s0(t) > 0. Therefore, for 0 < t 6 t0, 0 < f0
n(t) < 1, where the fact that
it is positive follows from the fact that ¿n;s0(t) is positive while the other inequality follows
from our earlier remark, since ¿n(t) 6= ¿0
n. We claim now that there is a well deﬁned analytic
function ¿1
n : [0;t0] ! Σn where for t 6= 0, ¿1




prove this claim it is suﬃcient to show that: (i) 1¡f0
n(t) is positive; and (ii) for each s 2 Sn,
¿n;s(t) ¡ f0
n(t)¿0
n;s is nonnegative with o(¿n;s(t) ¡ f0
n(t)¿0
n;s) > o(1 ¡ f0
n(t)). Point (i) follows
from the fact that f0
n(t) < 1. As for point (ii), for s = 2 S0
n, ¿n;s(t) ¡ f0
n(t)¿0
n;s = ¿n;s(t) > 0,
while if s 2 S0
n, ¿n;s(t) ¡ f0
n(t)¿0
n;s > ¿n;s(t) ¡ (¿n;s(t)=¿0
n;s)¿0
n;s = 0. Thus ¿n;s(t) ¡ f0
n(t)¿0
n;s is
nonnegative for each s 2 Sn. And, as a result, we also have that for each s 2 Sn, o(¿n;s(t) ¡
f0
n(t)¿0






n;s0)) = o(1 ¡ f0
n(t)). Thus,
¿1





for each t 6 t0. For 0 < t 6 t0, the support of ¿1
n(t) is contained in that of ¿n(t), since
fn(t) < 1; also, ¿1
n;s0(t) is zero, while ¿n;s0(t) is obviously not. Thus, supp¿1
n(t) ( supp¿n(t)
for all 0 < t 6 t0.22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
If ¿1
n(t) is a constant function mapping to, say, ¿1
n 2 Σn, let f1
n(t) = (1 ¡ f0
n(t)) and




n and we are done. So, assume that ¿1
n(t) is not a constant




n. We can repeat the above construction
for the function ¿1




n(t) : [0;t1] ! R and ¿2







n;s1; 0 < ˆ f1
n(t) < 1; ¿2
n(t) = [1 ¡ ˆ f1
n(t)]¡1[¿1










n;s(t) = 0 while ¿1
n;s1(t) is not: in particular supp¿2
n(t) $ supp¿1
n(t) $ supp¿n(t) for all













n(t)]. We can continue this process to obtain a sequence of analytic
functions ¿k
n : [0;tk] ! Σn, k = 0;1;:::; with 0 < tk 6 tk¡1, ¿k
n ´ ¿k
n(0), and a corresponding
sequence of analytic functions fk











This process must terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, in the sense that there exists
K 6 jSnj such that ¿K
n (t) is a constant function. ¤
Theorem (Main Theorem). If a reﬁnement satisﬁes Invariance and Strong Backward In-
duction then for any game a selected subset is a stable set of the equilibria of its strategic
form.
Proof. We show that if a reﬁnement selects a subset Σ± ½ Σ of proﬁles that is not a stable set
for the strategic-form game G then it satisﬁes Invariance only if it violates Strong Backward
Induction.
Suppose Σ± is not a stable set. Then there exists ² > 0 such that for each ± 2 (0;1) there
exists ´ 2 P±n@P± such that the perturbed game G(´) does not have an equilibrium in the ²-
neighborhood U of Σ±. Take a closed semi-algebraic neighborhood X of Σ± that is contained
in U. Let A = f(¸;¿) 2 (0;1)
N £ (Σn@Σ) j G(¸;¿) has no equilibrium in Xg; then A is
nonempty and there exists ¿± 2 Σ such that (0;¿±) is in the closure of A. Further, because
X is semi-algebraic, A too is semi-algebraic. Therefore, by the Nash Curve Selection Lemma
(cf. Bochnak, Coste, and Roy [4, Proposition 8.1.13]) there exists ¯ t > 0 and a semialgebraic
analytic map t 7! (¸(t);¿(t)) from [0;¯ t] to [0;1]N £ Σ such that (¸(0);¿(0)) = (0;¿±) and
(¸(t);¿(t)) 2 A for all t 2 (0;¯ t]. Deﬁne the compact semi-algebraic set
Y = f(t;¾) 2 [0;¯ t] £ X j (8 sn 2 Sn) ¾n;sn > ¸n(t)¿n;sn(t)g:
Observe that if (t;¾) 2 Y with t 6= 0 then ¾ is not an equilibrium of G(¸(t);¿(t)).SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 23
Lemma 5.3. There exists a positive integer p such that for every analytic function z 7!
(t(z);¾(z)) from an interval [0; ¯ z] to Y , where t(z) is a positive function, there exists a player
n and a pure strategy sn 2 Sn such that ¾(z) > ¸n(t(z))¿n;sn(t(z)) and sn is not a best reply
of order o(t(z))p against ¾(z).











and ¯(t;¾) = t. By construction, ®;¯ > 0 and ®¡1(0) µ ¯¡1(0). By Lojasiewicz’s inequality
(Bochnak et al. [4, Corollary 2.6.7]) there exist a positive scalar c and a positive integer p such
that c® > ¯p. Given an analytic map z 7! (t(z);¾(z)) as in the statement of the Lemma,
observe for each n;sn;s0
n, that ¾n;sn(z)¡¸(t(z))¿n;sn(t(z)) and Gn(s0
n;¾¡n(z))¡Gn(sn;¾¡n(z))
are also analytic in z. Therefore there exists a pair n;sn that achieves the maximum in the






n;¾¡n(z)) ¡ Gn(sn;¾¡n(z))] > ®(t(z);¾(z)) > (t(z))
p=c;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that ¾n;sn(z) ¡ ¸n(t(z))¿n;sn(t(z)) 6 1. By
assumption, t(z) is positive. Therefore, maxn;sn;s0
n[Gn(s0
n;¾¡n(z)) ¡ Gn(sn;¾¡n(z))] is also a
positive analytic function and, being greater than c¡1(t(z))
p, has order at most o(t(z))p. ¤




n, where each ¿k
n is a mixed
strategy in Σn and fk
n : [0;¯ t] ! R+ is analytic. Construct the game Γ in extensive form in
which each player n chooses among the following, while remaining uninformed of the others’
choices. Player n ﬁrst chooses whether to commit to the mixed strategy ¿0
n or not; if not
then n chooses between ¿1
n or not, and so on for k = 2;:::;Kn; and if n does not commit to
any strategy ¿k
n then n chooses among the pure strategies in Sn. Let ˜ S and ˜ Σ be the sets
of pure and mixed-strategy proﬁles in Γ. (As in the two-person case, for each player n and
each 0 6 k 6 Kn we identify all strategies of n that choose, at the relevant information set,
to play the strategy ¿k
n.) Because the strategic form of Γ is an expansion of G, Invariance
implies that for the game Γ the reﬁnement selects a subset of those strategies equivalent to
Σ±. We now show that the reﬁnement does not satisfy Strong Backwards Induction in the
game Γ. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose it does satisfy SBI. For perturbations
of the game Γ use the following action perturbation: for the information set where n chooses
between ¿k
n or not, use "k
n(t) = ¯ "k
n(t) = ¸n(t)fk
n(t); and at the information set where n chooses
among the strategies in Sn, use "Kn+1
n (t) = ¯ "Kn+1
n (t) = tp+1, where p is as in Lemma 5.3.24 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Let E be the set of (t;¾) 2 (0;¯ t] £ ˜ Σ such that ¾ is an f"(t)g-quasi-perfect equilibrium
of Γ (i.e. satisfying conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 2.2) whose reduced-form strategy proﬁle
in Σ lies in X. Because the minimum error probabilities are analytic functions of t, E is a
semi-analytic set.8 Strong Backward Induction requires that there exists ˜ ¾0 2 Σ¤ such that
the reduced form of ˜ ¾0 belongs to Σ0 and (0; ˜ ¾0) belongs to the closure of E. By the Curve
Selection Lemma (cf. Lojasiewicz [15, II.3]) there exists an analytic function z 7! (t(z); ˜ ¾(z))
from [0; ¯ z] to [0;¯ t] £ ˜ Σ such that (t(z); ˜ ¾(z)) 2 E for all z > 0 and (t(0); ˜ ¾(0)) = (0; ˜ ¾0). By
construction, 0 < o(t(z)) < 1.
From ˜ ¾(z) construct the analytic function ˆ ¾(z) as follows: for each player n, choose a
strategy s¤
n in Γ such that o(˜ ¾n;s¤
n) is zero; that is, a strategy in the support of ˜ ¾n(0). Let
S0
n be the set of all pure strategies sn of the original game G that are chosen with the
minimum probability in ˜ ¾(t) (that is, with probability (t(z))
p+1); let ˆ ¾n;sn(z) = 0 for each
sn 2 S0
n; deﬁne ˆ ¾n;s¤
n(z) = ˜ ¾n;s¤
n(z)+jS0
nj(t(z))
p+1; and ﬁnally, let the probabilities of the other
strategies in ˆ ¾ be the same as in ˜ ¾. Obviously, o(˜ ¾(z) ¡ ˆ ¾(z)) > o(t(z))(p + 1) > o(t(z))p,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that 0 < o(t(z)) < 1.
If ˆ ¾n;sn(z) > 0 for some sn 2 Sn then sn is a best reply against ˜ ¾(z); hence by Lemma
5.1 sn is a best reply of order o(t(z))p against ˆ ¾(z). Likewise, for each k the strategy sn
that plays ¿k
n at the appropriate information set is optimal of order o(t(z))p against ˆ ¾n(z) if
ˆ ¾n;sn(z) > ¸n(t(z))fk
n(t(z)).
Let ¾(z) be the reduced form of ˆ ¾(z) in the game G. Because ˆ ¾(0) = ˜ ¾(0), there exists
z¤ > 0 such that ¾(z) 2 X for all z 6 z¤. We claim now that we have a well-deﬁned
analytic function ' : [0;z¤] ! Y given by '(z) = (t(z);¾(z)): indeed, t and ¾ are analytic
functions and, as we remarked, ¾(z) is contained in X; also, for each n and sn 2 Sn,
¾n;sn(z) > ¸n(t(z))¿n;sn(t(z)), since in ˜ ¾(z) (and therefore in ˆ ¾(z)) the “pure” strategy ¿k
n
is chosen with probability at least ¸n(t(z))fk
n(t(z)). Therefore, ' is a well-deﬁned map, and
by the above lemma, there exist n;sn such that ¾n(z) assigns sn more than the minimum
probability even though it is not a best reply of order o(t(z))p against ¾n(z) (and ˆ ¾(z)). By
the deﬁnition of ¾(z) and ˆ ¾(z), either (i) sn is assigned a positive probability by ˆ ¾(z) or
(ii) a strategy ¿k
n (containing sn in its support, when viewed as a mixed strategy in Σn) is
assigned a probability greater than ¸n(¿(z))fk
n(t(z)), even though it is not a best reply of
order o(t(z))p against ˆ ¾(z), which contradicts the conclusion of the previous paragraph. In
the game Γ, therefore, for any sequence of suﬃciently small t there cannot be a sequence of
8A µ Rk is semi-analytic if for all x 2 Rk, there exists a neighborhood U of x, such that A \ U is a ﬁnite
union of sets of the form fy 2 U j f1(y) = ¢¢¢ = fm(y) = 0;g1(y) > 0;:::;gn(y) > 0g where f1;:::fm,
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f"(t)g-quasi-perfect proﬁles whose reduced forms are in X. Thus Strong Backward Induction
is violated. ¤
6. Concluding Remarks
The contribution of the Main Theorem is the demonstration that a ‘truly perfect’ form of
backward induction, namely Strong Backward Induction, in an extensive-form game implies
stability in the strategic form, provided one links the two forms by requiring Invariance.
We accept the arguments for Invariance and admissibility adduced by Kohlberg and
Mertens as entirely convincing—to do otherwise would reject a cornerstone of decision theory.
Our assumptions diﬀer primarily in using quasi-perfection to specify a form of backward in-
duction that ensures admissibility. Our result diﬀers in that we obtain a reﬁnement in which
a stable set must include a quasi-perfect and hence a sequential equilibrium of every extensive
form with the same reduced strategic form.9
In spite of its awkward name, quasi-perfection seems an appropriate reﬁnement of weaker
forms of backward induction such as sequential equilibrium. Some strengthening is evidently
necessary since a sequential equilibrium can use inadmissible strategies and strategies that
are dominated in the continuation from an information set. Strong Backward Induction is
used in the proofs mainly to establish existence of lexicographic probability systems that
‘respect preferences’ as deﬁned by Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2]. Thus Assumption
3.3 might state directly that each sequence of perturbations of an extensive form should
reﬁne the selected set by selecting a lexicographic equilibrium that respects preferences,
analogously to statement 3 of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 for two-player games. It seems
plausible that quasi-perfection can be characterized in terms of a lexicographic equilibrium
with the requisite properties.
Appendix A. Generic Two-Person Extensive Form Games
This appendix proves the analog of Corollary 4.2 for generic extensive-form games.
We consider a ﬁxed ﬁnite game tree with perfect recall and two players having the sets
Sn and Σn of pure and mixed strategies for each player n 2 N = f1;2g, and the spaces
9Kohlberg and Mertens [12, Appendix D] establish a comparable result in the special case of an isolated
equilibrium that assigns positive probability to every optimal strategy, and that is perfect with respect to
every perturbation of behavior strategies in every extensive form with the same reduced strategic form.
But such an ‘essential’ equilibrium need not exist; indeed, this seems to be the original motivation for
their deﬁnition of stable sets of equilibria. In [12, Appendix E] they argue that implementing backward
induction by sequential equilibrium cannot suﬃce to imply stability. They cite van Damme’s [6] work on
quasi-perfection but unfortunately they did not consider whether it is an appropriate implementation of
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S =
Q
n Sn and Σ =
Q
n Σn of pure and mixed strategy proﬁles. Given this game tree, let G
be the Euclidean space of players’ payoﬀs in extensive-form games with this tree.
Deﬁne E to be the following subset of the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspon-
dence over the space of games: E is the set of those (G;¸;¿;¾) 2 G £[0;1]£Σ£Σ such that
(a) ¾ is an equilibrium of G(¸¿) and (b) if ¸ = 0 then there exists a sequence ¸k 2 (0;1)
converging to zero and a sequence ¾k of equilibria of G(¸k¿) converging ¾. Denote by p the
natural projection from E to G.
Lemma A.1. For each game G, p¡1(G) is compact.
Proof. Fix a game G 2 G. Let Q be the set of those (´;¾) 2 P1 £ Σ such that ¾ is an
equilibrium of G(´). And, let Q0 be the subset of (0;¾) 2 Q. Because G is a two-player
game, Q and Q0 are unions of polytopes. Triangulate Q such that Q0 is a full subcomplex
and each simplex of Q is convex. Let X be the union of the simplices of Q that intersect
Q0 but are not contained in Q0. Because Q0 is a full subcomplex of Q, the intersection of
each simplex of X with Q0 is a proper face of the simplex. Let X0 = X \ Q0 and let X1
be the union of simplices of X that do not intersect Q0. Given a point x 2 X, let K be the
simplex that contains x in its interior. K \Xi is a nonempty face of K for i = 0;1 and every
vertex of K belongs to either X0 or X1. Therefore, x is expressible as a convex combination
®(x)x1 + [1 ¡ ®(x)]x0, where xi 2 K \ Xi for i = 0;1.
We are now ready to prove the Lemma. Obviously it is suﬃcient to prove that p¡1(G) is
closed. Accordingly, consider a sequence (G;¸k;¿k;¾k) in E converging to a point (G;¸;¿;¾).
We show that (G;¸;¿;¾) belongs to E. The result is clear if ¸ 6= 0. Therefore, assume that
¸ = 0. By the deﬁnition of E, we can assume without loss of generality that ¸k 2 (0;1) for
all k.
Because ¸k > 0, (´k;¾k) 2 QnQ0, where ´k = ¸k¿k. If necessary by passing to a sub-
sequence, we can assume that the entire sequence (´k;¾k) is contained in the interior of a
simplex K of Q. The limit (0;¾) of the sequence then belongs to K and, therefore, K is
contained in X. For each k there exists (0;¾0k) 2 X0\K, (´1k;¾1k) 2 X1\K and a number
®k > 0 such that (´k;¾k) = [1 ¡ ®k](0;¾0k) + ®k(´1k;¾1k). Clearly, for each k, ´1k = ¹k¿k,
where ¹k = ¸k=®k. Since X1 \K is compact, by passing to an appropriate subsequence, we
can assume that (´1k;¾1k) converges to some (´1;¾1) 2 X1 \ K, where obviously ´1 6= 0.
Because ´1k = ¹k¿k, and ¿k converges to ¿, this implies that ¹k converges to some ¹ 6= 0
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As (0;¾) and (´1;¾1) belong to K, so does (º´1;º¾1 + (1 ¡ º)¾) for all º 2 [0;1]. For all
º 2 (0;1] now, (G;º¹;¿;º¾1 + (1 ¡ º)¾) belongs to E, which shows that (G;0;¿;¾) belongs
to E. ¤
Deﬁne E±(G) = f(¿;¾) j (G;0;¿;¾) 2 Eg. By Statement 2 of Theorem 4.1, a closed set
Σ± of equilibria of G is a stable subset iﬀ for each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists ¾ 2 Σ± such
that (¿;¾) 2 E±(G). We invoke a slightly weaker concept of stability that turns out to be
equivalent to stability for generic games in G.
For G 2 G, deﬁne
˜ E±(G) = f(¿;¾) j 9(G
k;¸
k;¿;¾





Call a closed set Σ± of equilibria of G a pseudo-stable set of G if (8¿ 2 Σn@Σ)(9 ¾ 2 Σ±) such
that (¿;¾) 2 ˜ E±(G). Since E±(G) µ ˜ E±(G), if Σ± is a stable set then it is a pseudo-stable set
as well. The following Proposition shows that for generic games the two concepts coincide.
Proposition A.2. There exists a closed lower-dimensional semialgebraic subset Gy of G such
that for each G 2 GnGy every pseudo-stable set of G is a stable set.
Proof. As in Blume and Zame [3, x2 Lemma] one applies the Generic Local Triviality Theo-
rem to the projection map p from E to G to establish existence of a closed lower-dimensional
subset Gy ½ G such that for each connected component Gi of GnGy there exists a semi-
algebraic ﬁber Ci and a homeomorphism hi : Gi £Ci ! p¡1(Gi) such that [p±hi](G;c) = G
for all (G;c) 2 Gi £ Ci. By the previous Lemma, p¡1 is compact valued and thus Ci is
compact.
To prove the theorem it is suﬃcient to show that for each G 2 GnGy, E±(G) ¶ ˜ E±(G). Let G
belong to a component Gi of GnGy. Pick (¿;¾) 2 ˜ E±(G). We now show that (G;0;¿;¾) 2 E.
Since (¿;¾) 2 ˜ E±(G), by deﬁnition, there exists a convergent sequence (Gk;¸k;¿;¾k) !
(G;0;¿;¾) with each (Gk;¸k;¿;¾k) in E. Because Gi is a component of the open set GnGy,
the sequence (Gk;¸k;¿;¾k) is eventually in p¡1(Gi). Therefore, for large k there exists ck in
Ci such that hi(Gk;ck) = (Gk;¸k;¿;¾k). Ci being compact, there exists c 2 Ci that is a
limit of a convergent subsequence of ck. Obviously (G;0;¿;¾) is the image of (G;c) under
hi and is therefore in E. ¤
We now prove the analog of Corollary 4.2.
Theorem A.3. For each G 2 GnGy a closed subset of equilibria Σ± is stable iﬀ
(*) for each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists an equilibrium ¾0 in Σ±, a proﬁle ˜ ¾ 2 Σ,
and for each player n a lexicographic probability system Ln = (¾0
n;:::;¾Kn
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where Kn > 0 and ¾Kn
n = [1 ¡ ¸n]˜ ¾n + ¸n¿n for some ¸n 2 (0;1], such that
for each strategy s 2 Sn with
PKn¡1
k=0 ¾k
n(s) + [1 ¡ ¸n]˜ ¾n(s) > 0 and each
information set h of n that s does not exclude, s is a conditionally optimal
reply at h for player n against ¾
k(h)
m , where m 6= n and k(h) is the ﬁrst
k 2 f0;:::;Km g such that h is reached with positive probability when n
plays s and m plays ¾k
m.
Proof. The necessity follows by applying statement 3 of Theorem 4.1. To prove suﬃciency
we invoke Proposition A.2: it is suﬃcient to show that Σ± is a pseudo-stable set and thus
to show that for each ¿ 2 Σn@Σ there exists ¾ 2 Σ± with (¿;¾) 2 ˜ E±(G). Fix ¿ 2 Σn@Σ.
Let (L1;L2) be a an LPS proﬁle as in the statement of the Theorem. The proof uses the
construction and notation from the (suﬃciency) proof of Corollary 4.2. As there, obtain for
each player n, the LPS L0
n = (ˆ ¾0
n;:::; ˆ ¾K
n ). For each n,
ˆ ¾
K
n = ¹¿n + [(¹(1 ¡ ¸n)˜ ¾n + (¸n ¡ ¹)¾
0]=¸n
and is thus expressible as an average ¹¿n+(1¡¹)¯ ¾n, where ¯ ¾n is a convex combination of ˜ ¾n
and ¾±
n that equals ¾±
n when ¸n = 1 and ¹ < 1. The proﬁle (L0
1;L0
2) satisﬁes the optimality
property in (*). Speciﬁcally, for each player n, each strategy s that is in the support of ˆ ¾k
n
for k < K or in the support of ¯ ¾n when ¹ < 1 is optimal against L0
m in the following sense:
at each information set h that s does not exclude, s is conditionally optimal against ˆ ¾
k(h)
m ,
where k(h) is the ﬁrst level of L0
m that does not exclude h. Deﬁne ¾n(®) as in the proof of
Corollary 4.2. The optimality property for (L0
1;L0
2) implies that for each suﬃciently small ®
there exists a perturbed game G(®) such that: (a) G = lim®#0 G(®); and (b) each strategy in
the support of any ¾k with k < K, or in the support of ¯ ¾ if ¹ < 1, is an optimal reply to ¾(®)





Thus, (¿;¾0) is in ˜ E±(G) as claimed. ¤
Appendix B. Games with Perfect Information
This appendix generalizes the analysis of the example in x2.3 using the formulation in x3.
We consider an extensive-form game Γ with perfect information and, for simplicity, generic
payoﬀs and two players. As mentioned in x2.2, a proper equilibrium induces a quasi-perfect
and hence sequential equilibrium in every extensive-form game with that strategic form.
Therefore, in this section we represent Strong Backward Induction simply by the assumption
that a selected subset contains a proper equilibrium of the strategic form. Together with
10The proof of this fact follows the construction in the appendix of Kreps and Wilson (1982) by working
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Invariance, this implies that a subset Σ± is selected for the strategic form G of Γ only if,
for every game G0 equivalent to G, there exists a proper equilibrium of G0 that is equivalent
to some equilibrium in Σ±. To show that this property implies that a selected subset is
stable, for each strategy perturbation ´ of G we consider an equivalent game G0 obtained by
adjoining redundant strategic-form strategies that induce redundant behavioral strategies in
the extensive form Γ.
The interesting aspect of the following Proposition B.1 is that, even though the proper
equilibrium is merely the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extensive-form game Γ,
Invariance requires a reﬁnement to select a subset that includes other equilibria in a stable
set in the same component as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. This illustrates vividly that
even for perfect-information games, which are usually considered trivial and easily solved
by applying subgame-perfection, if one assumes Invariance then the selected subset must
survive all trembles of the players’ strategies.
Let Γ 2 GnGy be a two-person perfect-information game with generic payoﬀs, and denote
by G its strategic form. (The sets G and Gy are as in Appendix A and we further assume that
Γ has ﬁnitely many equilibrium outcomes, which is also a property of generic extensive-form
games.) Because Γ is a perfect-information game, each node x of the game tree of Γ deﬁnes
a subgame Γ(x) that has x as its root. When referring to player n, we use m to denote his
opponent. We say that a strategy ¾n 2 Σn enables (or, alternatively, does not exclude) a
node x in the game Γ if there exists ¾m 2 Σm such that x is reached with positive probability
under the proﬁle (¾n;¾m). If a strategy ¾n enables a node x then it induces a continuation
strategy in the subgame Γ(x) in the obvious way.
Let Σ± be a closed set of equilibria, all of which induce the same probability distribution
P ± over outcomes. For a node x in the extensive form of Γ, P ±(x) denotes the probability of
reaching x under the distribution P ±. Because Γ is a generic game with perfect information,
for each x such that P ±(x) > 0 and x is a node of one of the players, all equilibria in Σ±
enable x and prescribe the same (pure) action there.
Proposition B.1. Suppose a reﬁnement satisﬁes Invariance and selects only subsets con-
taining proper equilibria. If this reﬁnement selects Σ± in the game G then Σ± is a stable set
of G.
The basic idea of the proof is to obtain the LPS induced by a proper equilibrium of an
expanded game, and then truncate the LPS to obtain one that satisﬁes condition (*) in
Theorem A.3. Unlike the example in x2.3, here we add two types of redundant strategies30 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
to cover all possibilities in the general case. First we establish notation and then, since the
proof is long, we break it into a series of Claims.
Fix ¿ 2 Σn@Σ. We show that Σ± satisﬁes the condition (*) for the proﬁle ¿ in Theorem
A.3. Denote by b the behavioral strategy proﬁle that is equivalent to ¿. Since ¿ is completely
mixed, every node of Γ is reached with positive probability under b.
For each player n, let Xn be the set of nodes where he moves.
² Let Vn ½ Xn comprise those nodes x for which P ±(x) = 0 and the last node y
preceding x such that P ±(y) > 0 belongs to player m.
Each node x 2 Vn is excluded by player m’s equilibrium action at an earlier node
y 2 Xm that is on the equilibrium path.
Let Wn = XnnVn and let W 0
n be the set of x 2 Xn such that P ±(x) > 0. Obviously,
W 0
n µ Wn.
² Let Qn µ Sn be the set of pure strategies s of player n such that for each x 2 W 0
n, s
plays the unique action associated with Σ± at x.
Let Rn = SnnQn.
Qn is a nonempty set, while Rn is nonempty iﬀ there exists a node in W 0
n where
player n has at least two actions available.
The following Claim follows readily from our deﬁnitions.
Claim B.2. Suppose x = 2 W 0
n.
(1) If x belongs to Vn then every node y that belongs to Xm (resp. Xn) and that
precedes or succeeds x belongs to Wm (resp. Vn [ W 0
n). Moreover, x is enabled only
by strategies in Rm and it is enabled by some strategy in Qn.
(2) If x belongs to Wn then any node y in Xm (resp. Xn) and that precedes or succeeds
x belongs to Vm [ W 0
m (resp. Wn). Moreover, x is enabled by some strategy in Qm
and is enabled only by strategies in Rn.
The support of every equilibrium in Σ± is contained in Qm £ Qn. Also, for each n, every
strategy in Qn is a best reply against every equilibrium in Σ±, since the strategies in Qn
diﬀer only at nodes that are in Vn (which are excluded by the equilibria in Σ±, by point (1)
of Claim B.2) or in WnnW 0
n (which are excluded by all strategies in Qn by point (2) of Claim
B.2).
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² Let ¯ qn be a mixed strategy equivalent to the following behavioral strategy: at each
node x 2 Vn player n plays according to bn, and at each node x 2 Wn player n plays
according to ¯ sn. Obviously, ¯ qn is a mixture over strategies in Qn.11
² In case Rn is nonempty, let ¯ rn be a mixed strategy equivalent to the following behav-
ioral strategy: at each node x 2 Vn player n plays according to ¯ sn, and at each node
x 2 Wn player n plays according to bn. ¯ rn is a mixture over strategies in Rn and Qn
that assigns a positive probability to some strategy in Rn.
The following Claim also follows readily from the previous Claim and from our deﬁnitions.
Claim B.3. ¯ rn enables each node in Vm and Wn, and ¯ qn enables each node in Wm and Vn.
For each ± 2 [0;1] and sn 2 Qn, deﬁne:
² qn(sn;±) is the mixed strategy that plays sn with probability 1 ¡ ± and ¯ qn with
probability ±. qn(sn;±), like ¯ qn, is a mixture over strategies in Qn.
Let Qn(±) be the collection of these mixed strategies.
² In case Rn is nonempty, rn(sn;±) is the mixed strategy that plays sn with probability
1 ¡ ± and ¯ rn with probability ±. Like ¯ rn, rn(sn;±) assigns a positive probability to
some strategy in Rn. And since sn 2 Qn, the conditional distribution over Rn that
is induced by rn(sn;±) is the same as that induced by ¯ rn.
Let Rn(±) be the collection of these mixed strategies.
In sum,
qn(sn;±) = [1 ¡ ±]sn + ±¯ qn and rn(sn;±) = [1 ¡ ±]sn + ±¯ rn
where the contingency table for the choices by ¯ qn and ¯ rn at nodes x 2 Xn is:
x 2 Vn x 2 Wn
¯ qn[x] = bn[x] ¯ sn[x]
¯ rn[x] = ¯ sn[x] bn[x]
Let G(±) be the equivalent game obtained by adding for each player n all strategies in
Qn(±) [ Rn(±) as redundant pure strategies. Let S(±) and Σ(±) be the spaces of pure and
mixed strategy proﬁles for the game G(±), and let In = jSn(±)j. If Rn is nonempty, In =
jSnj + 2 £ jQnj; otherwise, In = 2 £ jSnj.
By assumption, for each ± there exists a proper equilibrium ˜ ¾1(±) of G(±) whose equivalent
proﬁle in Σ, call it ¾1(±), is in Σ±. By [2, Proposition 5] there exists for each player n an
LPS Kn(±) ´ (˜ ¾1
n(±);:::; ˜ ¾
In(±)
n (±)) over S(±) with full support, where In(±) 6 In, such that
the LPS proﬁle (K1(±);K2(±)) respects preferences; viz., if against Km(±) a pure strategy sn
11If one picks a diﬀerent ¯ sn to deﬁne ¯ qn then one obtains an equivalent mixed strategy, since all strategies
in Qn agree at nodes in W0
n and, by Claim B.2, exclude those in WnnW0
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for player n in G(±) is a better reply than another tn, then in Kn(±), sn is inﬁnitely more
likely than tn.12 (In particular, ˜ ¾1
n(±) is a best reply against Km(±).) Since In is independent






n (±)) where we
insert In ¡ In(±) copies of ˜ ¾1
n(±) before ˜ ¾2
n(±), we can assume that Kn(±) has In levels, i.e.
In(±) = In. Let Ln(±) = (¾1
n(±);:::;¾In
n (±)) be the corresponding LPS over Sn induced by
Kn(±); viz., ¾i
n(±) is the strategy in Σn equivalent to ˜ ¾i
n(±). Obviously for ¾n;¾0
n 2 Σn, ¾n
is a better reply against Km(±) than ¾0
n iﬀ it is a better reply against Lm(±) than ¾0
n. In
particular, ¾1
n(±) is a best reply against Km(±) and hence also against Lm(±).
Claim B.4. In Ln(±) every strategy qn 2 Qn is inﬁnitely more likely than every strategy
rn 2 Rn.
Proof of Claim. Fix a strategy qn 2 Qn. Because ¾1
m(±) belongs to Σ±, qn is a best reply to
¾1
m(±). Let i be the ﬁrst level of Ln(±) that assigns qn a positive probability. The ﬁrst level i0
of Kn(±) that assigns a positive probability to qn is such that i0 > i. (It is possible that i0 > i,
since a duplicate strategy qn(sn;±) that has qn in its support might be assigned a positive
probability by level i of Kn(±), thus accounting for the presence of qn in the support of ¾i
n(±).)
Then, since Kn(±) respects preferences, every strategy in the support of ˜ ¾j
n(±) (and hence of
¾j
n(±)) for j 6 i is a best reply to ¾1
m(±). As remarked above, ¾1
m(±) is a best reply against
Ln(±). Therefore, for suﬃciently small " > 0 the strategy proﬁle ¾(±;") = (¾1
m(±);¾n(±;")) is
an equilibrium of G, where ¾n(±;") = (" + ¢¢¢ + "i)
¡1 Pi
j=1 "j¾j
n(±). Because Γ is a generic
extensive-form game, the outcome induced by ¾(±;") is the same for all ", viz., they all induce
P ±. Therefore, all strategies in the support of ¾j
n(±) for j 6 i choose the unique equilibrium
action at each node x 2 W 0
n. Thus these strategies are all in Qn, and those in Rn = SnnQn
are only in the supports of strategies in levels j > i of the LPS. ¤
Now choose a sequence ±(k) converging to zero as k increases and let (K1(±(k));K2(±(k)))
and (L1(±(k));L2(±(k))) be the corresponding sequence of LPS proﬁles where the former
proﬁle respects preferences and (¾1
1(±(k));¾1
2(±(k))) 2 Σ±. Passing to a subsequence of
the ±(k)’s if necessary, [2, Proposition 2] implies the following. There exists for each n
and each 1 6 i 6 In, a positive integer Ji










n (k)) 2 (0;1)Ji
n¡1 converging to zero such that, for each k, ¾i
n(±(k))
is expressible as the nested combination
¾
i
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Thus we obtain an LPS Ln = (¾ij
n ), 1 6 i 6 In, 1 6 j 6 Ji
n, where the ordering is the
following: ij < i0j0 (that is, level ij is inﬁnitely more likely than level i0j0) if i < i0 or i = i0
and j < j0.
The strategy proﬁle where each player n plays ¾11
n , the ﬁrst level of his LPS, is in Σ± as it
is the limit of the sequence of proﬁles where each player n plays ¾1
n(±(k)). Because each level
i of Ln(±) is a nested combination of the LPS Li
n, a strategy ¾n is a better reply against Lm
than another strategy ¾0
n iﬀ for all large k it is a better reply against Lm(±(k)) than ¾0
n is.
In particular, strategies in the support of ¾11
n , which are obviously in the support of ¾1
n(±(k))
for all k, are best replies against Lm. Also, the nested property for Ln along with Claim B.4
immediately implies:
Claim B.5. In Ln every strategy in Qn is inﬁnitely more likely than every strategy in Rn.
In case Rn is nonempty, let i1
nj1
n be the ﬁrst level of Ln that assigns a positive probability









For each k, since each level i of Ln(±(k)) is a nested combination of levels of Li
n, i1
n is the




n (±(k);Rn) be the conditional distribution over Rn induced by ¾
i1
n





is limit of ¾
i1
n




n (Rn) using the sequence Kn(±(k)).
Clearly, i1
n is the ﬁrst level of Kn(±(k)) that assigns positive probability to a strategy in
either Rn or Rn(±). (Recall that each strategy in Rn(±) assigns a positive probability to
some strategy in Rn.) Let ®1
nk (resp. ¯1
nk) be the sum of the probabilities of the strategies
in Rn(±(k)) (resp. Rn) under ˜ ¾
i1
n
n (±(k)). Then ®1(±(k)) + ¯1(±(k)) > 0 since otherwise the
strategies in Rn would be assigned zero probability by ¾
i1
n




n;s(±(k)) of a strategy s 2 Rn under ¾
i1
n




nk¯ rn;s. Deﬁne a
strategy ¾¤
nk(Rn) 2 Σn as follows. If ¯1
nk > 0, then let ¾¤
nk(Rn) be the mixed strategy in Σn




that is, the probabilities of strategies in Qn under ¾¤
nk(Rn) are zero, while that of a strategy






nk = 0, let ¾¤
nk(Rnk) be an arbitrary mixed strategy in
Σn whose support in contained in Rn. Let R¤
nk be the support of ¾¤
nk(Rn). By construction,
R¤
nk is contained in Rn, and in case ¯1
nk 6= 0 it equals the set of strategies that are assigned
a positive probability by level i1
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By going to an appropriate subsequence of ±(k), ¹¤
nk converges to some ¹¤
n and ¾¤
n(Rn)
converges to some strategy ¾¤
n(Rn) with support, say, R¤
n. Because the support of ¾¤
n(Rn)




n (Rn) is now the conditional distribution over Rn that




Say that a pure strategy sn of player n is conditionally optimal against Lm if at every
node x 2 Xn that sn does not exclude the action prescribed by sn at x is optimal against
the ﬁrst level of Lm that does not exclude x.
Claim B.6. Suppose Rn is nonempty. (1) If ¹¤
n 6= 1 then every strategy in R¤
n is conditionally
optimal against Lm. (2) ¹¤
n 6= 0.
Proof of Claim. Suppose ¹¤
n 6= 1. Fix a pure strategy rn 2 Rn that is not conditionally
optimal against Lm. We show that rn = 2 R¤
n. R¤
n is the support of ¾¤
n(Rn), which is deﬁned
as the limit of ¾¤
nk(Rn). Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that rn does not belong to the
support R¤
nk of ¾¤
n(Rn) for all large k. Since ¹¤
n 6= 1, ¯1
nk 6= 0 for all large k. As remarked
above, this implies that for each such k, R¤
nk is the set of strategies that are assigned a
positive probability by level i1
n of Kn(±(k)). To show that for large k, rn = 2 R¤
nk, i.e. that it is
assigned probability zero by ˜ ¾
i1
n
n (±(k)), it is suﬃcient to show that for large enough k there
is a strategy r0
n 2 Rn [ Rn(±(k)) that is a better reply against Lm(±(k)). Indeed, the result
then follows from the fact that Kn(±(k)) respects preferences and that i1
n is the ﬁrst level of
Kn(±(k)) that assigns positive probability to some strategy in Rn [ Rn(±(k)).
Let x be a node of player n that rn does not exclude and where it is not conditionally
optimal. Consider ﬁrst the case P ±(x) > 0. Then ¾11
m is the ﬁrst level of Lm that does not
exclude x. It cannot be the case that rn chooses the equilibrium action at x since that choice
is optimal. Thus rn chooses a non-equilibrium action at x that is not optimal against ¾11
m at
x. Pick sn 2 Qn that is in the support of ¾11
n . sn is a best reply against Lm, while rn is not
even a best reply against ¾11
m. Therefore, there exists ±0 > 0 such that rn(sn;±0) is a better
reply against Lm than rn. Hence, there exists k0 such that rn(sn;±0) is a better reply against
Lm(±(k)) for k > k0. Because sn is a best reply against Lm, there exists k1 > k0 such that
sn is a best reply against Lm(±(k)) for k > k1. Consequently, for each ± < ±0, and k > k1,
rn(sn;±), which is a convex combination of sn and rn(sn;±0), is a weakly better reply against
Lm(±(k)) than rn(sn;±0). In particular, for k such that k > k1 and ±(k) < ±0, rn(sn;±(k)) is
a weakly better reply against Lm(±(k)) than rn(sn;±0) and therefore a better reply than rn.
Thus rn = 2 R¤
nk for large k.
Now suppose P ±(x) = 0. Let r0
n be a strategy that diﬀers from rn only in that it prescribes
an optimal continuation at x. Obviously r0
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a better reply than rn. Hence for all large k, r0
n is a better reply against Lm(±(k)) than rn.
Again rn is not in R¤
nk for large k.
To ﬁnish the proof of the Claim, it remains to show that ¹¤
n > 0. Suppose to the contrary
that ¹¤




n (Rn) = ¾¤
n(Rn) and thus by (1) all strategies that belong to Rn and




n are optimal against ¾11
m. Any other strategy that appears in the
support of a level ij that equals or precedes i1
nj1
n in player n’s LPS belongs to Qn and is
also optimal against ¾11
m. Also, ¾11
m is a best reply to Ln. Hence, for all small ", the strategy
proﬁle (¾11













n + j. ¾n(") assigns positive probability to strategies in Rn, which by
deﬁnition choose a non-equilibrium action at some node on the equilibrium path that they
do not exclude. Hence for " > 0, (¾11
m;¾n(")) induces an outcome diﬀerent from P ±, which
is impossible. Therefore, ¹¤
n > 0. ¤
Claim B.7. For x 2 Vn, the ﬁrst level of Lm(±) that enables it is i1
mj1
m. Moreover, the contin-










Proof of Claim. By Claim B.2, any strategy of m that enables x belongs to Rm—in partic-
ular, Rm is nonempty and i1
mj1
m is well deﬁned. By the deﬁnition of i1
mj1
m, therefore, x is
not enabled by ij < i1
mj1














m¯ rm. This last point
follows from Claim B.3 and point (2) of Claim B.6. ¤
Let Q+
n be the subset of strategies in Qn that are conditionally optimal against Lm. Let
i0
nj0
n be the ﬁrst level ij with the following property: if Qn = Q+
n, then every strategy in
Qn is assigned a positive probability by some level i0j0 6 ij; and if Qn 6= Q+
n, then level ij
assigns a positive probability to some s 2 QnnQ+





Claim B.5. Moreover, if Qn 6= Q+
n, i0
nj0
n > 11: ¾11
n assigns probability only to best replies
against Lm, and any strategy in QnnQ+
n is obviously not a best reply against Lm.
Claim B.8. Suppose Qn 6= Q+
n. Then ¯ qn assigns positive probability to some strategy in
QnnQ+
n.
Proof of Claim. Let sn 2 QnnQ+
n. Let x 2 Xn be a node that sn enables but where it not
conditionally optimal. Obviously P ±(x) = 0, since sn prescribes only the equilibrium action
at nodes on the equilibrium path. By Claim B.2, we therefore have that x 2 Vn. The result36 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
now follows from the fact that ¯ qn enables each node in Vn (Claim B.3) and is equivalent to
a behavioral strategy that mixes over all the actions at each such node. ¤
Suppose Qn 6= Q+
n. Let Q0
n be the set of qn 2 Qn assigned zero probability by levels
ij < i0
nj0
n. By deﬁnition there exists qn that belongs to Q0
nnQ+
n and that is assigned positive






n induces a well-deﬁned conditional distribution over
Q0





n). To compute this conditional distribution, we mimic what we did for
Rn above. (The only diﬀerence between what we present in the next paragraph and their
counterparts from before is that we use Q0
n instead of Rn and ¯ qn instead of ¯ rn.)
For each k, level i0
n is the ﬁrst level of Ln(±(k)) that assigns a positive probability to










n (±(k)). Using the above Claim, i0
n is also the ﬁrst level of Kn(±(k)) to assign a
positive probability to a strategy in Q0
n or in Qn(±(k)). As with Rn, there exist ¸¤
nk 2 [0;1]
and a mixed strategy ¾¤
nk(Q0
n) with support, say, Q¤
nk µ Q0





conditional distribution over Q0




nk¯ qn. If ¸¤
nk 6= 1 then
Q¤
nk consists of strategies sn 2 Q0




n . Going to the











n). Denote by Q¤
n the support of ¾¤
n(Q0
n).
We want to establish an analogue of the optimality property of R¤
n in Claim B.6 for Q¤
n.
Before doing so, we need a preliminary Claim.
Claim B.9. All strategies in Qn are equally good replies against any strategy for player m
whose support is contained in Qm.
Proof of Claim. The result follows from the following three observations. All strategies in
Qn agree at each x 2 W 0
n; they exclude nodes in WnnW 0
n, by point 2 of Claim B.2; ﬁnally a
node x 2 Vn is excluded by every strategy in Qm by point 1 of Claim B.2. ¤
Claim B.10. Suppose Qn 6= Q+
n. (1) If ¸¤
n 6= 1, each strategy in Q¤
n is conditionally optimal
against Lm, i.e. it belongs to Q+
n. (2) ¸¤
n 6= 0.
Proof of Claim. Suppose qn 2 QnnQ+
n. We show that qn = 2 Q¤
n. As in the proof of statement
(1) of Claim B.6, it suﬃcient to show that qn = 2 Q¤




n (±(k)), for large k. We claim that we are done if we can show that there exists
sn 2 Qn such that qn(sn;±(k)) is a better reply against Km(±(k)) for large k. Indeed, if
there does exist such an sn, then letting i(k) and i(qn;k) be, resp., the ﬁrst levels where
qn(sn;±(k)) and qn are assigned positive probability by Kn(±(k)), we have i(k) < i(qn;k) forSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 37
large k, because Kn(±(k)) respects preferences. By Claim B.8, level i(k) of Ln(±(k)) assigns
a positive probability to some some q0
n 2 QnnQ+
n. Hence, i0
n 6 i(k) < i(qn;±(k)) and qn is
assigned zero probability by ˜ ¾
i0
n
n . Thus, it is suﬃcient to show the existence of sn 2 Qn such
that qn(sn;±(k)) is a better reply against Km(±(k)) for large k.
Since qn is not conditionally optimal against Lm, there exists x 2 Xn that qn enables and
where it is not optimal against the ﬁrst level of Lm that enables it. Clearly, x = 2 W 0
n, since
qn chooses the equilibrium action at each node on the equilibrium path. As qn excludes each
node in WnnW 0
n, x 2 Vn and by Claim B.7, x is enabled by level i1
mj1
m. Let q0
n be a strategy
that agrees with qn everywhere except that in the subgame at x, it prescribes a continuation




m . Obviously, q0
n belongs to Qn and is a better reply to
level i1
mj1
m of Lm than qn. Pick sn in the support of ¾11
n . Because sn 2 Qn, sn and q0
n are
equally good replies against every level ij < i1
mj1
m of Lm, by Claim B.9. Because sn is a best
reply to Lm, it is at least as good a reply as q0
n against level i1
mj1










qn. Since the support of qn(sn;±0) is contained in Qn, again using Claim B.9, qn(sn;±0) is a
better reply to Lm(±) than qn. Hence there exists k0 such that for all k > k0, qn(sn;±0) is
a better reply to Lm(±(k)) than qn. Because ¾n is a best reply to Lm, there exists k1 > k0
such that sn is a weakly better reply to Lm(±(k) than qn(sn;±0) for all k > k1. Hence for all
k such that ±(k) 6 ±0 and k > k1, qn(sn;±(k)) is a better reply to Lk(±(k)) than qn, which
completes the proof of (1).
We now prove point (2). Suppose ¸¤
n 6= 1. Then by point (1) every strategy in the support
of ¾¤
n(Q0





n assigns positive probability to some strategy in Q0
nnQ+
n, it
must be that ¸¤
n 6= 0. ¤
Claim B.11. Let x 2 Wn. Then x is enabled by ¾ij




m and x is not enabled by level ij < i0
mj0










Proof of Claim. By Claim B.2, there is a strategy sm in Qm that enables x. Suppose Qm =
Q+
m. By the deﬁnition of i0
mj0
m, sm is assigned positive probability by some level ij 6 i0
mj0
m
of Lm, which then enables x.
Suppose now that Qm 6= Q+
m and x is not enabled by any level ij < i0
mj0
m. Then by the
deﬁnition of Q0








m induced by level i0
mj0
m is that induced by ¸¤









enables x. This last follows from point (2) of Claim B.10 and Claim B.3. ¤38 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Claim B.12. For each n there exists º¤
n 2 (0;1] and ¾¤




n¿n, we have the following properties:
(1) If ºn 6= 1 then ¾¤
n is conditionally optimal against Lm.




(3) If Qn 6= Q+
n then for each x 2 Wm that is not enabled by ij < i0
nj0
n, ¾n enables x and
prescribes the same continuation strategy in Γ(x) as level i0
nj0
n.
Proof of Claim. Suppose ﬁrst that Qn = Q+
n and Rn is empty, then let ¾n = ¿n. (º¤
n = 1 and
the choice of ¾¤
n is irrelevant.) Points (1) and (3) of the Claim holds trivially. As for point
(2), if Rn is empty, Vm is empty, by Claim B.2, and hence it too holds trivially.
Suppose now that Qn = Q+





Point (1) of this Claim follows from point (1) of Claim B.6 and point (3) holds trivially. As for
point (2) of this Claim, remark ﬁrst that by Claim B.7, the continuation strategy for player n




n is that given by (1¡¹¤
n)¾¤
n(Rn)+¹¤
n¯ rn. Since x 2 Vm, by Claim
B.2, every node of n that precedes or succeeds x belongs to Wn. ¯ rn and ¿n are equivalent
to behavioral strategies that choose the same mixture at each node in Wn. Therefore, ¾n




Finally, suppose now that Qn 6= Q+
n. Let V 0
n be the set of initial vertices of Vn, viz., V 0
n
is the set of nodes in Vn that are not preceded by any other vertex in Vn. By the deﬁnition
of V 0
n and Claim B.2, nodes in Xn that precede a node in V 0
n belong to W 0
n. Also, V 0
n is
nonempty. Indeed, if it is empty then Vn is empty; but then Qn = Q+
n because all strategies
in Qn prescribe the equilibrium action at each node in W 0
n and exclude all nodes in WnnW 0
n.
Thus, V 0
n is nonempty. For v 2 V 0
n, deﬁne º¤
nv to be the probability that ¿n enables v, i.e. º¤
nv
is the total probability under ¿n of the set of pure strategies that enable v. For each v 2 V 0
n,
deﬁne ¾¤
nv to be the mixed strategy that is equivalent to the following behavioral strategy:
in the subgame Γ(v) play according to ¾¤
n(Qn); elsewhere play according to ¾11
n . ¾¤
nv is a
mixture over strategies in Qn and if ¸¤
n 6= 1 then ¾¤




In case Rn is empty, deﬁne ˆ ¾n to be ¾11
n and let ˆ ¹¤
n = 1. In case Rn is nonempty, let ˆ ¹¤
n = ¹¤
n
and deﬁne ˆ ¾¤
n to be the mixed strategy that is equivalent to following behavioral strategy:
at each node x 2 Wn, play according to ¾¤
n(Rn); at each node x 2 Vn, play according to ¾11
n .
Obviously, when ˆ ¹¤





















































By point (2) of Claims B.6 and B.10, ¸¤
n 6= 0 6= ˆ ¹¤
n. Thus, ¾n is a well deﬁned strategy and
0 < º¤
n 6 1. If º¤









































n 6= 1. Then either ¸¤
n 6= 1 or ˆ ¹¤
n 6= 1. If ¸¤
n 6= 1 then each ¾¤
nv is optimal against Lm. And
if ˆ ¹¤
n 6= 1 then ˆ ¾n is optimal against Lm. Therefore, if º¤
n 6= 1 then ¾¤
n is optimal against
Lm. To prove point (2) we argue as follows. Suppose x 2 Vn. By Claim B.2, x is enabled
only by strategies in Rn. (In particular if Rn is nonempty, ˆ ¾n = ¾¤
n(Rn) and ˆ ¹¤
n = ¹¤
n.) The
only “components” of ¾n that enable x are ¿n and ˆ ¾n. Therefore, the continuation strategy
in Γ(x) under ¾n is that given (1 ¡ ˆ ¹¤
n)ˆ ¾n + ˆ ¹¤
n¿n. As before, any node of n that precedes or
succeeds x belongs to Wm. ˆ ¾n agrees with ¾¤
n(Rn) at each node in Wn while ¿n agrees with
¯ rn at each such node. Thus the continuation strategy in Γ(x) that is induced by ¾n is the
same as that given by (1 ¡ ¹¤
n)¾¤
n(Rn) + ¹¤
n¯ rn. The result now follows from Claim B.7.
It remains to prove point (3). Let x 2 Wm be a node such that the ﬁrst level of Ln that
enables it is i0
nj0
n. Since Qn 6= Q+
n, i0
nj0
n > 11. There must exist v 2 V 0
n that precedes
it: otherwise, by Claim B.2, the only nodes preceding x belong to W 0
n and x is enabled
by ¾11
n . By construction, the strategies ¾¤
nv0 for v0 6= v and ˆ ¾¤
n(Rn) choose the continuation
strategy prescribed by ¾11
n in the subgame Γ(v). Because ¾11
n does not enable x, clearly
these strategies do not either. Therefore, the only “components” of ¾n that enable x are
¾¤
nv and ¿n. Thus, the continuation action prescribed by ¾n in Γ(x) is that prescribed by














n cancels out. In the subgame Γ(v), qn prescribes the same continuation as ¿n while
¾¤
nv prescribes the same continuation as ¾¤
n(Q0
n). The probability of enabling v under qn or
¾¤
n(Qn) or ¾¤
nv is 1, whereas the corresponding probability for ¿n is º¤
nv. Hence it is clear that
¾n prescribes the same continuation strategy in Γ(v)—and, therefore, in Γ(x), as x succeeds
v—as does the strategy (1¡¸¤
n)¾¤
n(Qn)+¸¤
nqn. Point (3) follows by applying Claim B.11. ¤40 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
We construct a new LPS Ln as follows. Suppose ﬁrst that Qn = Q+
n. Ln is obtained by
deleting all levels succeeding i0
nj0
n and adding the mixed strategy ¾n deﬁned above as the last
level. If Qn 6= Q+
n then i0
nj0
n > 11 so Ln has more than one level. Delete all levels succeeding
i0
nj0
n and replace level i0
nj0
n with a mixed strategy ¾n as deﬁned above.
To ﬁnish the proof of the Proposition it remains to show that every strategy in the support
of ¾¤
n (as deﬁned in the previous Claim) or of a level of Ln before the last is conditionally
optimal against Ln. Point (1) of the above Claim in conjunction with the following Claim
establishes this optimality property.
Claim B.13. A strategy of player n is conditionally optimal against Lm iﬀ it is conditionally
optimal against Lm.
Proof of Claim. We show the following. For each node x 2 Xn the ﬁrst level of Lm that does
not exclude x induces the same continuation strategy for m in Γ(x) as the ﬁrst level of Lm
that does not exclude x.
If x 2 W 0
n then the ﬁrst level of Lm enables it and coincides with the ﬁrst level of Lm. If
x 2 Vn then by Claim B.7 the ﬁrst level of Lm that enables it is i1
mj1
m and the result follows
in this case by point (2) of the previous Claim. If x 2 WnnW 0
n then, by Claim B.11, x is
enabled by some level ij 6 i0
mj0
m of Lm. If ij < i0
mj0
m or if Qm = Q+
m then x is enabled by
the same level of Lm as that of Lm. Finally, if Qm 6= Q+
m and x is enabled only by level i0
mj0
m
of Lm then the result follows from point (3) of the previous Claim. ¤
Appendix C. Signaling Games
This appendix provides a simple proof of a variant of Theorem 4.1 for two-player two-stage
signaling games of the kind depicted in Figure 3 in x2.1. For these games, the strategic-form
and extensive-form perfect equilibria coincide, and if payoﬀs are generic then they are the
same as the sequential equilibria and all equilibria in each component yield the same outcome.
The extensive form is described by three nonempty ﬁnite sets (T;M;A) and the scenario
in which player 1 (the sender) observes some type t 2 T and then sends a message m 2 M;
next, player 2 (the responder) observes only the message m that was sent and based on this
observation chooses an action a 2 A. The set of pure strategies for the sender is S = MT,
and for the responder, R = AM. A particular game G is obtained by specifying the players’
payoﬀs and nature’s probabilities: let the payoﬀ to player n be un(t;m;a) and let ¼t > 0 be
the prior probability of type t. A generic signaling game has ﬁnitely many Nash equilibrium
outcomes. Therefore, in each component of equilibria, the sender has a unique equilibrium
strategy and the indeterminacy in equilibria arises only from multiple actions for the receiverSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR STABLE EQUILIBRIA 41
following out-of-equilibrium messages from the sender. Cho and Kreps [5] cite and Banks
and Sobel [1, Theorem 3] prove the following characterization.13
Proposition C.1 (Cho and Kreps, Banks and Sobel). For a generic class of signaling games,
an equilibrium component is stable if and only if for each unsent message m and each
probability distribution µ 2 ∆(T) there exists in the component a sequential equilibrium
sustained by the sender’s belief ¹ 2 ∆(T)M such that ¹(¢jm) is in the convex hull of µ and
∆(Tm), where Tm is the subset of types (if any) indiﬀerent between sending m and using an
equilibrium strategy. [That is, Tm = ft j
P
a2A u1(t;m;a)°(ajm) = u±
1(t)g where u±
1(t) is the
equilibrium conditional expected payoﬀ of the sender given her type t and the responder’s
strategy °.]
Such a sequential equilibrium satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition for stability in Theorem 4.1
even if it is not induced by a proper equilibrium. The following shows that this anomaly
disappears when Invariance is invoked.
Proposition C.2. Fix an equilibrium component Σ± of a generic signaling game. If there
exists an unsent message m and a probability distribution µ 2 ∆(T) for which the condition
in Proposition C.1 is violated then there exists an equivalent game, obtained by adding a
single mixed strategy of the original game as an additional pure strategy, with no proper
equilibrium that is equivalent to some equilibrium in Σ±.
Proof. Fix a message m that is an out-of-equilibrium message in the component Σ±. Pick
µ 2 ∆(T). Choose a pure strategy s 2 MT in the support of the sender’s equilibrium
strategy in Σ±. For each type t let stm be the pure strategy that agrees with s except that
stm(t) = m—in stm type t sends the message m while all other types send the message
prescribed by s, which is diﬀerent from m, since m is an out-of-equilibrium message. Let
ˆ ¾(±) be the mixed strategy that assigns probability 1 ¡ ± to s and probability ±´tm to stm,
where 0 < ± < 1 and ´tm = [µt=¼t]=
P
t2T[µt=¼t]. Thus, ± is the probability of a tremble
in favor of m that with probability ´tm deviates in the event t from s(t) to m. Observe
that conditional on the strategy ˆ ¾(±) and a tremble in favor of the unsent message m, the
posterior probability that the message m came from type t is




Consequently, ¹(tjm; ˆ ¾(±)) = µt. Now append ˆ ¾(±) as a new pure strategy in the strategic
form. This expanded game has the same reduced strategic form as the original game. Assume
13This Proposition can also be proved using the characterization result in Theorem A.3.42 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
now that for every small ± > 0, there is a proper equilibrium of the expanded game that
induces the same outcome. We show that (m;µ) must satisfy the condition in Proposition
C.1.
Fix ± and let (¾±;½±) be a proper equilibrium whose reduced form belongs to Σ±. By
deﬁnition, there exists a sequence of (¾±;";½±;") of "-proper equilibria converging to (¾±;½±).
Let ¹±;"(¢jm) be the induced sequence of posteriors on the types conditional on m, and let
°±;" 2 ∆(A) be the induced mixed action of the responder after receiving message m. Let
¹± and °± be the corresponding limits. Let u±
1(t) be the equilibrium payoﬀ to type t of the
sender in the component Σ±. Deﬁne f±(t) =
P
t06=t ¼t0u±
1(t0) + ¼tu1(t;m;°±), which is the
expected payoﬀ to the sender when type t deviates by sending m and the responder replies
with the behavioral strategy °±. Let T ± = argmaxt f±(t), the set of those types with the
smallest disincentive to sending m when the responder uses °±.
We claim that ¹± belongs to the convex hull of µ and ∆(T ±). To see this, consider any
pure strategy s0 of the original game that sends message m for a subset T 0 " T ± of types. Fix
some t0 2 T 0nT ±. The strategy s0 does no better against ½± than the strategy st0m. (Recall
that the strategy st0m is one in which type t0 sends message m while all other types send the
message prescribed by strategy s, which is in the support of the sender’s equilibrium strategy
in Σ±.) For t¤ 2 T ±, f(t¤) > f(t0), since t0 = 2 T ±. Therefore, the strategy st¤m does strictly
better than st0m (and s0) against ½± and hence against ½±;" for all small ". Consequently, the
limit belief ¹± is not determined by any pure strategy of the original game where a type not
in T ± sends m. In other words, ¹± is determined by the relative probabilities of ˆ ¾(±) and
those pure strategies for which only types in T ± send message m. Hence, ¹± belongs to the
convex hull of µ and ∆(T ±) as asserted.
Let S(±) be the set of stm such that t 2 T ±. Observe that by deﬁnition all strategies in
S(±) yield the same payoﬀ against ½±. Now suppose for some ± that the new pure strategy
ˆ ¾(±) does strictly better than the pure strategies in S(±) against ½±. Then we claim that
the limit belief is µ and the condition in Proposition C.1 holds. By the conclusion from the
last paragraph, to prove this claim it is suﬃcient to show that for any strategy s0 where a
nonempty subset ˆ T ± of T ± of types send message m, ˆ ¾(±) is a better reply against ½± than
s0. To prove this last point, consider such a pure strategy s0: the pure strategy stm, where
t 2 ˆ T ±, is at least as good a reply as s0 against ½±; in turn stm does strictly worse than ˆ ¾(±)
as it belongs to S(±). Thus ¹± equals µ if ˆ ¾(±) does strictly better than the pure strategies
in S(±).
Finally, if for each ± suﬃciently small the strategies in S(±) do at least as well as ˆ ¾(±)
then their payoﬀs against ½± must be arbitrarily close to
P
t ¼tu±
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is at least (1 ¡ ±)
P
t u±
1(t) ¡ ±K for a positive constant K. Consider now a sequence of ±’s
going to zero such that T ± is constant, call it T ¤, and (¹±;°±) converges to, say, (¹¤;°¤).
Then ¹¤ belongs to the convex hull of µ and ∆(T ¤). Moreover, for each type t 2 T ¤,
u1(t;m;°¤) = u±
1(t). Thus again the condition in Proposition C.1 holds. ¤
For instance, the result of applying the Intuitive Criterion to the examples in Figures 2
and 3 in x2.1 can be obtained by invoking stability, or simply by observing that the preferred
component is the one containing a proper equilibrium.
Cho and Kreps [5, p. 220] conclude that, “if there is an intuitive story to go with the full
strength of stability, it is beyond our powers to oﬀer it here.” Proposition C.2 shows that
if one recognizes that “the full strength of stability” entails Invariance, and that a proper
equilibrium induces a sequential equilibrium in every extensive-form game with the same
strategic form, then the “intuitive story” is less mysterious.
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